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 The SCUD hunt problem that emerged during Operation Desert Storm has 
become a source of great interest to major commands like Air Combat Command.  One 
of the metrics used to measure the effectiveness of our operations in a SCUD hunt is time 
to detect and target.  We use the agent-based System Effectiveness and Analysis 
Simulation (SEAS) to provide a simulation environment in which all the elements of a 
SCUD hunt mission can adequately be modeled.  Our Blue Force agents are modeled as 
multirole fighters, satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) with various sensor 
capabilities.  The Red Force agents are modeled as SCUD transporter/erector/launchers 
(TEL).  Particular interest is paid to the effectiveness of various sensors modeled in a set 
of scenarios following an experimental design.  Four measures of performance (MOP) 
were fashioned to provide insight into the contribution of sensors at work in a SCUD 
hunt.  These MOPs were evaluated to show any statistically significant differences 
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During Operation Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein made attempts to weaken 
coalition forces by launching SCUD missiles against Israel.  Though weak in military 
utility, this act demonstrated Iraq's willingness to use the SCUD as a weapon of terror (if 
armed with a biochemical warhead) and as a weapon of provocation against smaller 
regional countries.  The U.S. countered by supplying Israel with Patriot anti-missile 
batteries.  Additionally, the U.S. initiated "SCUD Hunt" missions to find the elusive, 
mobile transporter-erector-launchers (TEL) and defeat the threat before it left the ground. 
The Iraqi's had become very skillful at minimizing the time required to move the 
launchers into location and prepare the SCUD for launch.  Contrary to the Soviets, who 
used the SCUD's predecessor, the R-17, and usually spent 90 minutes to set up, the Iraqi's 
streamlined their efforts to yield a turn-around time of approximately 30 minutes (Ripley, 
1996).   
Thirteen years later, during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), planners faced the 
same threat as before – evasive launchers capable of delivering biochemical payloads.  
Because the problem wasn't new, the difficulty came in deciding how many and what 
kind of resources to dedicate to solving the problem on the battlefield (i.e., hunting, 
finding and destroying a mobile launcher.)  This gave rise to the nagging question of how 
effective the tactics employed to hunt, find and destroy the SCUDS were. 
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Compiling years of data, several hundred potential launch sites were identified 
throughout Iraq and resources of various kinds were used to monitor those sites for 
activity.  The resources used include special operations forces, unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAV), as well as reconnaissance, surveillance and strike aircraft.  Each of these had the 
mission of detecting and identifying a mobile TEL and, once identified, the kill chain was 
initiated in order to destroy the TEL before a SCUD could be launched. 
The above vignette is the classic Blue versus Red scenario – except that much of 
it is a real-world happening.  The difficulty in modeling such events has long been the 
obstacle many commands have had to deal with.  Recent changes in the modeling and 
simulation world have produced very powerful, yet simple, models capable of better 
handling situations as described above. 
To begin orienting ourselves toward this research, we must first discuss what a 
model is.  The Air Force Modeling and Simulation Resource Repository defines a model 
as "[a representation of] the processes performed by a system; for example, a model that 
represents the software development process as a sequence of phases" (DoD Definition, 
DoD Directive 5000.59, DoD Publication 5000.59-P).  A better definition is offered by 
Law (2000) who says that models are physical, mathematical or logical representations of 
systems, possibly simplified in some way, to gain insight into how the system behaves, 
and even predicts future behavior (Law, 2000: 2).  Law also notes that models can fall 
into several different categories: 1) physical; 2) analytical; or 3) simulations.  Physical 
models deal with real-world objects whereas analytical models produce exact results 
because they are populated with exact relationships and quantities.  Simulations, 
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however, allow for various input and output parameters, thereby giving the modeler 
greater flexibility in analysis of the results. 
For this research, we will be dealing with combat models – those models that 
reflect aspects of military operations.  As can be seen in Figure 1, combat models exist, in 
one form or another, at all levels of the modeling pyramid.  Each level will provide a 
different amount of insight into the problem being modeled.  Starting with the lowest 
level, the engineering level, models have a narrow scope; thus, they are very detailed and 
specific in the questions they address.  As you move up the pyramid, the models tend to 
get larger in size typically due to aggregation from the lower levels.  Consequently, these 
models have wider scopes and contributions but less detail for individual processes.  Our 
focus will primarily be at the Mission Level of the pyramid.  Our model is an agent-based 
model called the System Effectiveness and Analysis Simulation, or SEAS. 
 
Figure 1. Hierarchy of Models (Miller, 2005) 
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 Air Combat Command (ACC) is sponsoring this research and supporting our 
efforts to quantify the effectiveness of "sensors" as modeled in a scenario mimicking the 
SCUD hunt missions of Operation Desert Storm.  Due to their interest in the sensor 
aspect of the mission, we will model appropriate mission-type sensors on appropriate 
mission-type airborne platforms, including satellites, and determine the effectiveness of 
the sensors in shortening the Find-Fix-Track-Target (F2T2) timeline. 
Research Objective 
 The objective of this research is to provide ACC with a flexible analysis tool 
allowing the capability to analyze trade-offs between various generic sensors and mixes 
of sensors. 
Research Focus 
 The focus of our research is two-fold.  First we will be assessing the value added 
by incorporating sensor data into the kill-chain timeline in order to shorten the time it 
takes to detect, engage and remove a potential target.  Second, we will be modeling the 
scenario using SEAS, an agent-based model.  SEAS will be used because it has shown 
itself to be user-friendly and contains the modeling capability required for this effort.  
Our research will draw primarily on two bodies of work completed to support military 
analysis.  The first resource was completed by the Air Force Research Laboratory Air 
Vehicles Directorate (AFRL/VACD) and used SEAS to model unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAV) involved in hunter/killer missions.  The second resource is academic work done 
by Major Robert Hassler (2005) at the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT).  His 
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work used Excel to model the SCUD hunt mission and was supported by ACC.  It is 
believed that the addition of sensor data will bolster the results previously obtained in 
other research efforts supporting similar research objectives. 
Overview of Thesis 
 Following the introduction, Chapter 2 provides a look at the available literature on 
agent-based modeling (ABM).  The literature review will first take a broad look at the 
concept of ABM starting with defining what ABM is.  The amount of literature in the 
realm of ABM is voluminous; thus, an overview and some history are provided.  Our 
next step is to familiarize the reader with how ABM has been, and currently is being, 
used in both the military and industry contexts.  It is important to understand that our 
research supports a military sponsor so much of the literature review will have a military 
application in its context.  As mentioned above, this research will be using SEAS as its 
modeling platform, so the next section of the literature review will delve into what SEAS 
is and how it relates to ABM and this research.  The literature review next covers the 
research that has been done supporting similar objectives as our research.  Chapter 2 
concludes with a section discussing the use of sensors in ABM as it relates to our 
research objective. 
 Chapter 3 begins the real work behind this research – the model.  Details on what 
our model does and how our model was built will be provided.  The methodology of our 
research will have direct impact on the results of our model.  Thus, care will be taken to 
describe the methods we will use to accomplish our objective.  After completing the work 
on our model, Chapter 4 will discuss the analysis performed on the results.  The post-
processing of the data is the pinnacle of any research effort and ours will be no different.  
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The various measures of effectiveness will be analyzed and the results discussed.  
Chapter 5 will conclude our research and offer any ideas for future research.  Some of 
these ideas are extensions to our methodology and give insight into new aspects of our 
problem, or new problems entirely.  It is our hope that this research will support others in 
their pursuit of modeling excellence in operations research. 
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II. Literature Review 
Introduction 
Modeling and simulation (M&S) has its roots dating back to the 1940s and its 
current usage does not lie entirely in military applications.  Alongside the military 
applications, M&S is widely used in the social sciences, biological sciences and 
environmental sciences.  This is important to understand because it is a constant reminder 
that the mathematics which drive M&S are not restricted to the military, but rather are 
shared by the world and all its undertakings.  The second section of this chapter begins 
with a definition of agent-based modeling and then discusses its history and some of its 
current uses with regards to military applications.  Following that, the discussion goes 
into some detail on the specific model being used for this research.  It concludes with 
some limitations and benefits of using agent-based models.  The third section of the 
chapter focuses on some of the specific work that has been accomplished on real-world 
scenarios.  Much of this work is precursory research to our model and is an invaluable 
resource to our effort.  Before concluding Chapter 2 we will touch on sensors – the main 
thrust of this research.  Although the detailed discussion on sensors is reserved for 
Chapter 3, we will look at some of the general types and uses of sensors in the military 
environment as well as how sensors are used in the model specific to this research. 
Agent-based Modeling 
Definitions 
Agent-based modeling (ABM) has just about as many definitions as it does 
authors and researchers, so pinning down a definition can be a difficult task.  However, 
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the designers of one successful ABM define it as an environment in which  
"…complex, real-world systems are modeled as a 
collection of autonomous decision making entities, called 
agents. Each agent individually assesses its situation and 
makes decisions based upon its own set of rules. Agents 
may execute various behaviors appropriate for the system 
they represent - for example, sensing, maneuvering, or 
engaging" (SPARTA, Inc.: Home Page, 2005) 
 
Many characteristics are present in agent-based models, which allow the surfacing 
of other definitions to take place – at least for the various echelons contained within the 
realm of agent-based models.  The most foundational echelon is the agent itself.  In his 
thesis, Capt Joseph Price states that agent-based modeling "…utilizes small building 
blocks, known as agents, to represent objects within the system" (Price, 2003:14).  
Russell and Norvig (1995) describe an agent as being an entity, real or virtual, that 
perceives and acts in its environment.  Rocha (1999) defines agents as "…distinguishable 
from [their] environment…possess some kind of identity…have some autonomy of 
action, that they can engage in tasks in an environment without direct external control."  
Other defining characteristics are an agent's interactions with and amongst other agents 
(if the simulation is built around multiple agents), the set of rules by which the agent 
operates, the agent's awareness of self, or even the fact that an agent can have its own 
resources with which to use in the simulation environment – even against other agents.  
These constitute just a small portion of the defining characteristics of agent-based models 
and, in particular, the agent.  A formal definition by Ferber (1999) discusses both single 
agent and multiple-agent systems.  An agent is a physical or virtual entity 
- that is capable of acting in an environment; 
- that can communicate directly with other agents; 
- that is driven by a set of tendencies (has autonomy); 
- which possesses resources of its own; 
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- that is capable of perceiving its environment; 
- that has only a partial representation of this environment; 
- which possesses skills and can offer services; 
- that may be able to reproduce itself; and 
- whose behavior tends towards satisfying its objectives, taking account 
of the resources and skills available to it and, depending on its 
perception, its representations and the communications it receives. 
  
 Multi-agent systems must include: 
- an environment; 
- a set of objects that can be perceived, created, destroyed and modified 
by the agents; 
- an assembly of agents; 
- an assembly of relations linking the agents; 
- an assembly of operations enabling agents to perceive, produce, 
consume, transform, and manipulate objects; and 
- operators whose task is to represent the application and reaction to 
these operations. 
 
 Another element, which distinguishes ABM from other types of models (i.e. 
equation-based models like steady-state simulators, discrete event simulators, etc.), and 
has become an item of great interest in many fields of study, is that of emergent behavior.  
Emergent behavior is that behavior which is not "pre-programmed" into the agents, but 
rather surfaces as a result of agent interactions, resource utilization and the changing of 
an agent's goals.  Any one of these can immediately differentiate one agent from another.  
As agents accomplish their programmed goals and reprioritize other goals due to agent-
agent interaction, or agent-environment interaction, they continually morph themselves 
into something that was not programmed and, thus, exhibit behavior that could not have 
been postulated.  "This ability to possess alternate behaviors enables the agents to adapt 
over time beyond their initial state and may result in unexpected system behavior" (Price, 
2003:16). 
 As indicated previously, the environment of an ABM is crucial to the operating of 
all agents therein.  The environment is initially constructed by the code written for the 
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model.  Initial model constructs such as terrain, flight paths, deployment locations, and 
resources such as guns, planes, vehicles, buildings and facilities, are the items an agent 
has to work with (or own).  This type of "ownership" implies that the agent is capable of 
moving toward and utilizing that resource.  However, depending on the type of system 
you are trying to represent, the use of mobility may be a function you wish not to employ.  
For example, a model representing forest growth would keep the trees as spatially, 
immobile agents.  The lack of mobility in this case would preclude most emergent 
behavior due to the fact that the agents don't move and have limited, if any, interaction 
with each other.  If mobility were a desirable characteristic, however, it would give an 
agent the ability to alter its behavior within the model over time.  Thus, a dynamic, 
flexible operating environment also defines agent-based models and stands it apart from 
other types of models that are more static in nature. 
Overview and History 
ABM has a long lineage upon which it stands.  Its roots go back to the late 1940s 
when mathematician John von Neumann came up with the idea of machines that would 
be able to reproduce.  The idea was beyond its time and, at that time, completely 
impractical.  His idea revealed a device that would operate on very simple, yet precisely 
detailed, instructions in order to make a copy of itself.  Having made its clone, the 
original, or parent, device would then give a copy of the instructions to the duplicate.  
Now, the duplicate has the capability to reproduce itself, and so on.  Von Neumann 
machines, as they were called, were nearly impossible to construct physically, but a 
friend urged Von Neumann to draft one on paper.  After much contemplation, the result 
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was a grid on which each cell had the capability to "live" and reproduce itself according 
to the given instructions.  This device became known as cellular automata. 
 Following cellular automata, ideas and theories began to push the current state of 
thinking.  If cellular automata could simulate a complex process, such as life, using 
simple, well-defined instructions, what implications might that have in other fields of 
study?  Craig Reynolds (1987) used the emerging theories to develop a model that 
simulated the flocking of birds, called bird-oids or "boids".  This model was the first 
contemporary use of individual agents.  Additionally, it was the first model that revealed 
the emergent behavior phenomenon.  It was expected that the boids would group together 
as a flock does, but it was not expected that the flock of boids would then reveal related 
group motion. 
Applications of Agent-based Modeling 
 A quick survey of the literature on ABM will show that its use extends far beyond 
that of military operations.  In fact, it is a driving tool in the simulation and analysis of 
the social sciences, the biological sciences, oceanography, and traffic management.  
Though it is not our intent to expound in these areas of study, we wanted to make brief 
mention of some efforts.  Military applications are of primary interest to this research – 
and there is a plethora of case studies that discuss the applications of ABM to various 
military issues.  It should not come as a surprise that so much information exists since 
military models, either physical, mathematical or logical, have been used to support force 
structure (manpower) and whole acquisition processes (or phases contained therein), not 
to mention their use in education and training – especially training in combat, space 
operations and pilot training. 
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 Within the past several years, the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) has 
produced several thesis papers in which ABM was used to simulate, and analyze, events 
such as German U-boats in the Bay of Biscay (Carl, 2003; Price, 2003).  Carl's approach 
to the historical U-boat event focused on the application of several classic search theory 
algorithms to a multi-agent model so as to compare the effectiveness of finding high-
valued, mobile targets.  The foundational search patterns used in his model were 
borrowed from those in use by the Coast Guard during search and rescue missions, and 
were employed to develop a "…methodology for empirically quantifying the effects of 
different search patterns on search efficiency" (Carl, 2003:3).  The Defense Modeling and 
Simulation Office sponsored his work because of their interest in studying the virtue of 
emergent behavior in agent-based models.  Price's thesis work applied game theory to the 
same historical scenario – U-boats in the Bay of Biscay.  An ABM was used because it 
"…provides the means to model complex systems with non-linearities, by allowing for 
interactions among independent agents" (Price 2003:ix).  The game theory element 
dovetails nicely within the modeling construct because it focuses on maximizing an 
objective by providing insight into strategies and outcomes.  Is that not the same 
objective of a military decision maker? 
Another thesis of interest was completed by Capt Gregory DeStefano (2004) in 
which he used ABM to evaluate the transition of information and requirements from the 
Department of Defense Architectural Framework (DoDAF) into an ABM.  The purpose 
was to show "…how to create an executable model of an actual DoD weapon system 
described by the DoDAF" (DeStefano, 2004:iv).  Additionally, his research aimed at 
verifying that the translation of data from the DoDAF into the model would accurately 
13 
capture measures of effectiveness.  All three theses writers found that ABM was the 
appropriate avenue to accomplish their research goals. 
Bullock, McIntyre and Hill (2000) worked, in a combined effort between AFIT 
and the Air Force Studies and Analysis Agency, to apply ABM to military issues by 
taking a complex adaptive system approach to ABM in order to capture airpower 
strategic effects.  The authors built the Hierarchal Interactive Theater Model (HITM) to 
show that Air Force doctrine and airpower theory, when modeled with agents, can 
provide outcomes consistent with "the expected results of strikes against centers of 
gravity defined in Air Force doctrine" (Bullock, 2000:1739).  Their realistic results 
demonstrate ABM as a well-suited means of simulating strategic effects at the operational 
level.  They suggest the following as some reasons for using agent-based models: 
- To capture force interaction and unpredictability. 
- To find out not who won, but why they won.  This forces a new level of analysis. 
- To determine differing levels of initial conditions and which have the most 
profound effect on a system.  This can lead to identifying centers of gravity. 
- It allows for the modeling of an unpredictable system. 
- It allows you to focus on the process of conducting military operations and the 
individual agents that act in conducting those processes. 
 
Contrasting their approach to linear models, they contend that linear models 
attempt to obtain an analytical solution, and will break a large problem up into smaller 
pieces.  The smaller pieces are then linearized and the individual results then aggregated 
to obtain a result.  The problem with this process is that not all problems have inherent 
(or natural) points of decomposition.  One such problem is war.  War is a complex 
environment, and those engaging in war compose a complex system of actions and 
interactions.  Hence, it can be surmised that an agent-based model would best be able to 
capture the interactions at various levels because the agents act independently of each 
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other and are governed by their own set of rules.  These rules allow for autonomous agent 
action and reaction to the environment and other agents' behavior.  In other words, each 
agent has its own Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) loop that enabled the authors to 
gain insight to the nature of the entities' interactions and unpredictability.  Their bottom 
line: "…an agent-based modeling approach using OODA loops is an effective way to 
simulate strategic effects at the operational level of war" (Bullock, 2000:1745). 
 Other researchers have written volumes on ABM – some in attempts to simply 
understand what it is; while others use ABM to generate response surfaces from their data 
in order to describe correlations; and yet others who use agents to gain new insight into 
existing, and well-worked, problems.  Such would be the case for Altenburg, Schlecht 
and Nygard (2002) writing from North Dakota State University.  They worked to 
maximize mission effectiveness with intelligent munitions deployed against a known 
number of targets.  This problem is not new to the military.  Every combatant 
commander, in every conflict decision, wants to maximize his troops' effectiveness 
against the enemy.  More specifically, when dealing with intelligent munitions, mission 
effectiveness is crucial due to the cost of the munitions alone; thus, mission effectiveness 
takes on a whole new importance factor.  Their research discussed several characteristics 
of the agents that can be attributed to many other previous ABMs in the biological and 
other sciences – namely, the use of avoidance, attraction, following, dispersion, 
aggregation, homing and flocking.  The use of these properties as the basis for the 
behavior of the agents' sensors is what is interesting.  These sensor characteristics are 
state-dependent and are characteristic of a reactive, behavior-based agent control 
philosophy.   This has direct application to our research in that, our agents will be given 
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certain rules by which they will operate; however, they will have the ability (under the 
agent-based modeling construct) to develop emergent behavior.  This essentially allows 
the agents to reprioritize their goals and their approach to obtaining those goals.  More 
will be discussed on this aspect of our research in Chapter three. 
 Utility has also been found in applying ABM to military issues.  For instance, Dr. 
Michael Young (2000) sees a great future for the use of ABM to help with Command 
Post Exercises.  He states that "Exercises may be conducted at strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels and are used both to evaluate existing operational plans and develop and 
test new operational concepts and tactics."  Envision, if you will, the same statement but 
replace the word "exercises" with "models."  That is what Dr. Young is getting at – not 
only does modeling save the Commander money from having to send out "all" his troops 
to participate in the exercise, but it also saves time – allowing for more rigorous 
investigation and analysis of the exercise procedures.  His opinion on the state of 
modeling in the Air Force is that the Air Force desires to see more (i.e. improved) 
modeling capability in the use of more realistic training equipment and the simulation of 
rank structures (i.e. echelons.)  Thus, if the Command Post is modeled as the highest 
represented unit and all subordinate personnel represented by individual agents, an ABM 
is a prime candidate to execute this type of model because each agent can now be owned 
by the higher echelons – in this case, the Command Post. 
ABM has also been used in military/industry crossover projects such as the 
United States Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory's Project Albert.  Project Albert, 
probably the largest multi-disciplinary modeling effort today, is a Congress-supported 
initiative aiming to address high-level decision-maker questions.  High performance 
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computers (HPC), and their networking capabilities, are utilized in order to generate the 
volumes of data the laboratory wants.  Project Albert is not actually a model – it is a suite 
of ABMs.  These models include Map-Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA), 
Socrates and Pythagoras.  Each of the models contributes a unique perspective to the 
overall effort while every one of the models is used in the process of data farming and 
data mining – techniques used, in conjunction with the HPC environment, to produce 
massive amounts of data.  This data is then studied to give insight into non-linearity, 
intangibles and co-evolution.  Non-linearity means that small changes to initial conditions 
may lead to large changes in expected results.  Intangibles are concepts such as 
leadership, morale and trust.  Co-evolution is the internal interaction between agents that 
results in "thoughts" such as "I think he thinks…." (Widdowson, 2003) 
Alongside Project Albert is the Irreducible Semi-Autonomous Adaptive Combat, 
or ISAAC, computer simulation.  ISAAC is not a model, and, according to Illachinski 
(2000), is a "conceptual playground" of agent-based combat modeling.  Because ISAAC 
is agent-based, a bottom-up approach to combat can be used and emergent behavior can 
be captured due to interactions at the agent level.  This concept ties in nicely with later 
discussions on the model to be used for our research. 
System Effectiveness and Analysis Simulation 
 The model used for this research is the System Effectiveness and Analysis 
Simulation (SEAS) developed by SPARTA, Inc.  Officially, SEAS is developed and 
maintained by SPARTA, Inc. for the Space and Missile Systems Center Directorate of 
Transformation and Development (SMC/TD) and is primarily used to help evaluate the 
military utility of proposed space systems by quantifying the contributions of space 
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services - ISR, communications, weather, navigation, strike - to the warfighter in theater-
level operations (SPARTA, Inc.: Home Page, 2005).  Due to the flexibility in its Tactical 
Programming Language, SEAS addresses quite well the problem of mobile targets that 
can evade and surface in order to engage.  Additionally, SEAS has a robust 
communication capability allowing satellites to broadcast targeting information to 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) which, in turn, transmit the targeting information to the 
fighter base in order to launch aircraft.  These specific qualities are valuable to this 
research and will be covered in more detail in Chapter 3.  For now, consider Figure 2, a 
graphical representation of SEAS agents in their simulated operational environment, from 





































The SEAS Simulated Environment
SEAS is a time
step simulation
Δt = 1 minute
Personnel
Agents execute parallel threads of user defined 
tactical programming language (TPL) that controls 
their behavior
 
Figure 2. The SEAS Simulated Environment (SPARTA, Inc.: Introduction, 2005) 
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SEAS will be an integral part of this research because it is an ABM and because of the 
desired programming capabilities it contains.  No model is useful, however, unless you 
are able to do something with the results it provides; thus, SEAS has an integrated post-
processor that will be used to analyze the results.  Additionally, SEAS is a verified and 
validated model accepted as part of the Air Force's Standard Analysis Toolkit.  R. Glenn 
Stockton, Chief, RQD, sees this as an important aspect because, as he notes, "It is 
possible to do a good, competent analysis using a model that has significant, known, 
deficiencies.  It would be very easy, on the other hand, to do bad analysis using a model 
that everybody agrees is a good one (if we ever were to get such a model)" (Stockton, 
1987). 
Limitations and Benefits of Agent-based Models 
 Thus far, we have seen how ABMs have been used and in what ways they have 
been applied to some very challenging problems; however, the grass in not always 
greener on the other side.  ABMs do have their drawbacks.  The types of models that 
have been discussed are mathematical models that are played out in simulations.  That 
being the case, one can easily imagine how difficult it is to program agents to have 
intangibles such as emotions and feelings.  Though ABM is also being greatly pursued in 
the artificial intelligence community, it has not made it to the point where agents make 
decisions based on how they "feel."  Thus, the biggest downfall to agent-based combat 
models and most models in general, is that they cannot capture random and complex 
behaviors such as heroism, leadership and morale. 
On the positive side, since simulations only require man-hours and computing 
power as resources, their biggest benefit to the field of knowledge is that they are cost 
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effective, compared to actually trying to "play" out the simulation in the form of an 
exercise.  It goes without saying that no one is willing to start a war just to find out how 
the pre-planned strategies are going to pan out. 
Also, if you don't like the way the results look you can change the inputs.  
Knowing that a model exists to give insight and not solutions means that if you change a 
model's input parameters, then you should expect to get different results.  The beauty of a 
model is that you can make all of these changes without affecting "reality" until you're 
ready, and have the authority, to do so.  Thus, it can be said that models have great 
impact and utility in giving analysts and decision-makers insight into behaviors 
encountered in complex scenarios. 
 The real benefits in ABM are represented by its dynamic operating environment 
and its ability to model individual agents and allow those agents to develop emergent 
behavior.  Emergent behavior can differ from one scenario to the next, which is what 
makes ABM so powerful – the more replications of a scenario you run, the more 
opportunities you have to capture emergent behavior and the more data points you have 
for great analysis. 
ABMs are getting better every day and a growing variety of problems are utilizing 
its flexibility.  ABMs are becoming increasingly more robust as a result of the 
improvement of faults in other models.  They have valuable tools and provide decision 
makers with more complete information to help make sense out of complex situations.  
The next section reviews some of the previous research that has been done and is of 
special interest to our research.  These works have added to the contemporary knowledge 
of military systems and have applied ABM to gain invaluable insight to those systems. 
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Previous Research 
 Two certain bodies of work have been done that contain specific aspects of 
modeling which this research will draw from.  Both of these are military studies and, with 
the addition of our desired measures of effectiveness, provide a solid foundation for our 
work to begin. 
The Air Force Research Laboratory Air Vehicles directorate (AFRL/VACD), has 
used ABM to assess mission effectiveness on morphing-wing technology enabled UAVs.  
Additionally, they used ABM to perform a cost-benefit analysis on those UAVs (Brown 
and Martin, 2005:4).  Morphing-wing technology gives an aircraft the ability to 
"significantly alter its wing shape to accommodate the very different performance 
demands of varying missions" (Withrow and Sanders, 2005).  This kind of technology 
has been available for years and is, in fact, already in use.  Consider the F-14 Tomcat and 
B-1B Lancer – both have variable sweep wings, which is an early form of morphing 
technology concepts.  What AFRL/VACD has done is recognized ABM's ability to 
capture the "non-linear behaviors in real-world operations and explicitly model the sensor 
to shooter chain" (Brown and Martin, 2005:11).  This insight, accompanied by the 
context of their hunter/killer operations scenario, has made it a resource for our research.  
The morphing-wing UAVs were launched on missions to search for targets and change 
the shape of their body structure to loiter over the target, engage the target, or dart from 
one location to another.  The results of their work showed that by using an ABM, they 
were able to reflect sensitivity in many of the key air vehicle input parameters such as 
fuel burn rates and speeds, as well as varying the flight profiles of the different air 
vehicles (Brown and Martin, 2005:22).  Two characteristics of their work will be of 
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importance to our work – manipulation of the input parameters for sensitivity analysis 
and the use of an ABM for a search mission. 
Maj Robert Hassler (2005) developed an Excel model to support Air Combat 
Command's (ACC) desire to know more about the SCUD hunt missions the United States 
was engaged in during Operation Desert Storm.  Specifically, ACC was interested in 
finding ways to shorten the mobile SCUD launcher kill chain (i.e. the time to search for 
and identify mobile SCUD launchers, then launch friendly strike aircraft to destroy the 
launcher before it fires a SCUD).  In order to assess the kill chain timeline, Maj Hassler 
needed to develop a scenario in which the friendly forces performed surveillance 
missions looking for mobile hidden targets. 
The kill chain timeline for a SCUD transporter/erector/launcher (TEL) includes 
the time for the TEL to be detected, identified, engaged and destroyed – either by the 
sensor platform or by the strike aircraft queued by the sensor.  Maj Hassler roughly 
estimated the kill chain timeline to equal 10 minutes – three of which are used to 
adequately detect and identify the TEL and the remaining seven for cueing, engagement 
and destruction of the TEL.  The competing timeline is the 30 minutes required for an 
Iraqi crew to mobilize, erect and launch a SCUD.  These two timelines were compared to 
compute an effectiveness score.  It was determined that as long as each target site is 
surveyed every twenty minutes, the coalition forces will be able to destroy a target, if 
active, before it can launch a SCUD.   
The focus of Maj Hassler's research was to develop an Excel-based model which 
automates the many tasks required to map sensors to targets.  One way to handle this type 
of problem is by considering a knapsack problem.  In the typical knapsack problem, a 
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person has a limited volume knapsack but also has a large quantity of items to place 
inside the knapsack.  Since the volume of items is greater than the volume of the 
knapsack, the person must decide what to take and what to leave.  A variation of this 
problem is the fractional knapsack problem whereby the person can take portions (or 
fractions) of items and thus maximize what is taken in the knapsack.  The fractional 
knapsack problem can be solved utilizing a greedy algorithm (Cormen, 2003).  Though 
this approach finds an optimal solution to a strict fractional knapsack problem (Cormen, 
2003), it is not optimal when employed against variations of the strict fractional knapsack 
problem.  However, applied to these variations solid results are obtained which give good 
insights and can be easily executed (Jensen and Bard, 2003). 
Translated into knapsack terminology, each sensor is a knapsack with its period of 
activity, or VUL, as the capacity of the knapsack.  The targets are the items to be placed 
in the knapsack.  Remaining knapsack capacity is represented by the cost of traveling to a 
target and surveying it.  Surveying a target is the value-added benefit of adding that item 
to the knapsack.  So if a target is to be surveyed, it must have a value-added benefit 
which is greater than the cost of getting to and surveying it. 
Several assumptions are applied to the model.  First, each sensor can only survey 
one target at a time.  Multiple targets can be surveyed at once but only if each target is 
within the sensor's field of regard.  Second, in order for a target to be surveyed, the sensor 
must be at the target's exact location.  Third, the flight path between targets is 
unobstructed by terrain, enemy threat systems, etc.  Fourth, the time required to survey a 
target and the time required to destroy a target are constant.  Fifth, each sensor travels at a 
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user-defined constant speed.  Sixth, any target may be revisited at any time by any active 
sensor. 
When all was said and done, Maj Hassler had an Excel model which 
accomplished two main goals:  first, it established flight paths which would, in part, 
optimize (or maximize) the sensor's contribution to the search effort; second, it calculated 
an effectiveness score which helped determine how well the sensor set covered the target 
set.  
We now have the necessary tools to begin taking on the next iteration of modeling 
this scenario.  Like AFRL/VACD, we will be using SEAS to model a "search" mission.  
Like Maj Hassler, we will be "searching" for hiding targets.  However, our work will now 
incorporate various sensor platforms into the model to provide another level of detail and 
aid in better analysis.  Sensors onboard aircraft can be used to detect and surveil elusive, 
hiding targets.  Complementing those would be sensors on satellites and airborne 
reconnaissance platforms.  The next section will detail the types of sensors our work will 
employ. 
Description and Modeling of Sensors 
Introduction 
Mankind has always employed the use of "sensors" to gain an advantage over an 
opponent.  Early history shows us that scouts were sent out to find and report enemy 
locations.  More recently, balloons were fitted with cameras and sent aloft to take pictures 
of the enemy's whereabouts.  The future of modern-day sensors has been secured due to 
the technology upon which they are based.  As technology advances and allows us to 
utilize sensors in a new fashion, or to a better level of detail, we will be able to collect the 
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data required to make timely decisions.  As Mark Hewish (2002) states in The All-seeing 
Eye Above, "The challenge is to distil information from the plethora of data, and provide 
it to warfighters in time for them to act appropriately." Thus, it is an understatement to 
say that sensors play an important part in military applications – most notably to detect 
targets, though, sensors are also capable of notifying that they have been detected.  
Detection of targets is particularly important for this research.  At this point the term 
"sensor" has only a generic meaning.  For instance, an aircraft, UAV or a satellite can 
each be regarded as a sensor – as long as it contains the capability to detect (either 
actively or passively) an object.  Or, a sensor can be just that – a device, contained on 
another platform, used to detect the target which the platform is looking for.  To gain an 
initial understanding of the use of sensors in SEAS refer to Figure 3 which gives an 
overview of sensors as devices used by agents. 
 
Figure 3. Sensor Device Overview (SPARTA, Inc.: Sensor, 2005) 
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Onboard Sensors 
An onboard sensor is the second type of sensor discussed above.  This can 
include, but is not limited to, synthetic aperture radars (SAR) and electro-optical/infrared 
(EO/IO) devices, to name just two.  As discussed in email correspondence with Air 
Combat Command (Berg, 2005), there are certain aspects of sensor capability that are 
desired for this research: Azimuth and elevation limits (i.e. the total field of view, not the 
field of regard), as well as range, probability of identification (Pid) and probability of 
detection (Pd).  SEAS will allow sensor parameters to be set for each specific entity to 
which it is attached.  Thus, the airplanes can have different onboard sensors compared to 
the UAVs and the satellites, and the UAVs can have different onboard sensors compared 
to the airplanes and satellites, etc.  Figure 4 is a screenshot from SEAS v3.5 showing the 
sensor input box.  It is in this location that each sensor to be used, by the various entities, 
is named and its specific parameters are input. 
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Syntax Description 
Sensor                  "sensor_name"  
Min_Range         [x]  
Break_Range     [x] 
 
            Max_Range        [x] 
 
            Az_Width            [x] 
El_Min                [n] 
            El_Max               [x] 
            TLE                    [x] 
            TVE                   [x] 
 
            TLE_Mode         [n]  
 
            TLE_Aspect       [n]  
TVE_Aspect       [n]  
MTI                 [mode]  
 
            MDV                   [x]  
 
            PId                      [x]  
 
            BDA_Prob          [x]  
            BDA_Time         [x]  
Cued                [flag]  
 
            Cue_Range        [x]  
Cue_Quality       [x]  
 
            Daylight_Only   [flag]  
Active               [flag]  
 
            Detects_Active  [flag]  
 
            Detects_Launches     [flag]  
 
            Detects_Weapons     [flag]  
 
            Designator        [time]  
 
            Max_Hops           [x]  
 
            Max_Tracks         [x]  
            Value                   [x]  
IFF_Prob             [x]  
            Draw                  [flag]  
 
            Terrain_DB             "dbname"  
            Weather_DB           "dbname"  
End 
 
Default = 0.0(km) The minimum detection range  
Default = 0.0(km) The range where the Pd starts to drop off linearly 
(see below)  
Default = 4000(km) Range at which Pd goes to zero. Can be set per 
target in Pd table.  
Default = 360(deg) Azimuth field of regard for sensor  
Default = -90(deg) Minimum elevation angle for sensor field of regard  
Default = 90(deg) Maximum elevation angle for sensor field of regard  
Default = 20(m) Gaussian one sigma target location error  
Default = 0(m/min) Gaussian one sigma target velocity error. When 0, 
no velocity reported.  
Default = 1 A flag to make TLE and TVE range dependent (= 1) or not 
(= 0).  
Default = 1 Ratio of cross range TLE to down range TLE.  
Default = 1 Ratio of cross range TVE to down range TVE.  
Default = 0 Moving target mode. 0=detects moving and stationary, 
1=moving only, 2=stationary only  
Default = 0 Minimum detectable target velocity (km/hr). Ignored if MTI 
not = 1  
Default = 1 Contribution this sensor makes to probability of target 
identification (0-1).  
Default = 1.0 Probability of correct BDA (type 1 error only)  
Default = 0.0(min) Time to perform BDA  
Default = 0(false) Can this sensor use a cue to improve detection 
range & Pd  
Default = 40000(km) Maximum range for cued detection  
Default = 0.0 Pd improvement for qued detection. Pd = 1-(1-
Pd_old)*(1-Cue_Quality)  
Default = 0(false)  
Default = 0(false) Does this sensor emit radiation that can be 
detected by a "Detects_Active=1" sensor  
Default = 0(false) Does this sensor detect emitters. Pd table must 
specify the active sensor(s) or comm devices it detects  
Default = 0(false) Does this sensor detect missile launches. Pd table 
must specify the missile(s) it detects  
Default = 0(false) Does this sensor detect weapons fire. Pd table 
must specify the weapon(s) it detects  
Default = 0(min) How many min should a detected target be 
illuminated (kept in track regardless of Pd)  
Default = 8 How many comm hops this sensor's sightings can make. 
Zero will keep it on the local platform.  
Default = 0 How many targets can be kept in track. Zero = infinite.  
Default = 100000  
Default = 0.0 Probability of misidentifying a friendly as an enemy  
Default = 1(true) Off(0) On(1) display of sensor's field of regard. (2) 
adds a dotted line detection display.  
Terrain affects the sensor's range  
Weather affects the sensor's Pd  
Figure 4. Sensor Input Screen (SPARTA, Inc.: Sensor, 2005) 
Types of Sensors 
Sensors are not all the same, nor do they all have the same mission.  Though they 
all serve to exploit the distinct parts of the electromagnetic spectrum, various sensors will 
perform their mission in different ways, on different platforms, and in different 
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environments (i.e. space, ground, clear weather, inclimate weather, etc.)  Though it goes 
without saying, a sensor will perform optimally if employed in the environment for which 
it was intended.  This proves interesting when you consider that the same sensor, say, a 
SAR, can be employed on both an airplane and a satellite.  So we can capitalize on a 
sensor's strengths to support/complement other "players" in the overall battle-space.  
Hewish (2002) remarks on this in The All-seeing Eye Above: 
Sensors with a wide field of view can cue those of higher 
resolution, but with a narrower gaze, to areas of interest. 
For example, a SAR aboard a high-altitude loitering 
platform may pick out objects for further examination by 
an EO/IR package. A radar operating in GMTI [ground 
moving-target-indication] mode can follow a mobile 
missile launcher until it disappears beneath the tree canopy, 
then hand it over to a FOPEN [foliage-penetration] sensor. 
Radio-frequency receivers on a fighter aircraft may detect 
and identify targets for prosecution using the on-board fire-
control radar or EO/IR targeting systems.  
Complementary sensors may be installed aboard different 
platforms, linked by high-capacity data networks, or 
grouped together on the same vehicle. 
 
Referring to satellites, he writes: 
 
Space-based radars offer several advantages, including 
virtual invulnerability to attack and the ability (assuming a 
large enough constellation) to conduct continuous 
surveillance. They can look down into valleys, and observe 
the deep battle that is beyond the radar horizon of platforms 
such as Joint STARS or MC2A [multi-Sensor Command 
and Control Aircraft.] 
 
Jane's International Defence Review was referenced at http://www.janes.com for 
the types of sensors onboard a Predator UAV and an F-16 Fighting Falcon to be used in 
the SEAS model so as to best mimic reality. 
For the Predator, the Jane's database entitled "GA-ASI MQ-1 and RQ-1 Predator" 
lists the following sensor information:  
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- fixed, nose-mounted daylight color TV camera to aid remote piloting 
- L-3 Wescam 14TS Skyball sensor in the undernose ball turret 
- Northrup Grumman AN/ZPQ-1 Tactical Endurance Synthetic Aperture Radar 
(TESAR) with face-plate antenna in undernose bay 
- Raytheon AN/AAS-52 Multispectral Targeting System (MTS) which combines a 
third-generation infrared sensor, wide-field-of-view TV, and laser range-finding 
designation and targeting features 
 
For the F-16 Fighting Falcon, the Jane's database entitled "Lockheed Martin 
(General Dynamics) F-16 Fighting Falcon" lists the following critical sensor 
information: 
- AN/APG-68(V)9  high-resolution Synthetic Aperture Radar – offers better air-to-
air range and all-weather precision targeting while improving resolution, track 
accuracy and reliability 
 
For the satellite sensors, I will be modeling a generic satellite that will have the 
search and detect capabilities that a Synthetic Aperture Radar offers as well as the ability 
to detect moving targets with a GMTI sensor.  Thus, no specific satellite constellation 
will be modeled and, in order to provide sufficient coverage, a constellation of nine 
satellites will be modeled. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has covered a lot of material, beginning with the definition of agent-
based modeling.  As was seen, there are numerous definitions based on the purpose of the 
model.  We then moved on to view some of the rich history of agent-based modeling in 
many areas of study (biology, medicine, social and environmental sciences, etc.) to 
include our main focus on military applications.  The first section concluded with some 
of the limitations and benefits of modeling and simulation.   
The next section of material we covered provided a basis for the requirements 
needed for this research.  Namely, what sensors are and how they will be used in our 
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model.  Sensors are, generically, any devices that can detect, either actively or passively, 
a mobile or stationary target.  For this effort, a sensor will be a device owned by an 
independent agent within the model and used for the same purposes – to detect a target.  
These sensors will range from aircraft to UAVs to an on-orbit satellite.  In order to 
capture results similar to real-world data, every attempt will be made to model the 
sensors with real-world parameters from sound unclassified military data sources like 
Jane's International Defence Review and the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). 
Finally, we reviewed previous work in this area of research.  The Morphing-wing 
Technology work done by AFRL/VACD applied the agent model SEAS to UAVs 
performing a search and kill mission.  Maj Robert Hassler did his graduate research 
project on modeling SCUD hunt missions as they occurred in Operation Desert Storm.  
Some time was spent discussing his Excel model so as to gain insight into his problem 
statement and methodology.  The section concluded with the results of his model which 
were presented, with great satisfaction, to Air Combat Command. 
The next chapter, Chapter 3, will discuss the methodology behind the building of our 
model.  We will combine the SEAS work done by AFRL/VACD and the fractional 
knapsack search problem worked on by Maj Hassler, to create a SEAS model that 




We now begin to explore the process of selecting and building a combat scenario 
to be used in the System Effectiveness Analysis Simulation (SEAS) agent-based model.  
Following the scenario background underpinning this research, an explanation of the 
code composition will pave the way for our discussion on the Warfile itself.  Before that, 
however, the Measures of Effectiveness will be laid out.  Prior to concluding, a 
description will be given, in detail, of both the Red and Blue forces that will be 
simulated. 
The term “scenario” describes the who, what, when, where, why and how of what 
will be modeled; however, in the SEAS lexicon, what will be built is a Warfile.  SEAS is 
a modeling environment where agent entities process the commands programmed in the 
Warfile.  Thus, the Warfile contains the “scenario” written in tactical programming 
language (TPL), or “code”, and then simulated by the agents.  Once complete, the 
Warfile will be used for researching how agent-based models can provide valuable 
insight and information on the role sensors play in searching for elusive, hiding targets.  
This information will be passed on to Air Combat Command (ACC) which is sponsoring 
our research. 
Scenario Background 
 Before getting into the actual process of selecting and building a model, we must 
first understand the who, what, when, where, why and how behind our Warfile.  During 
Operation Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein made attempts to weaken coalition forces by 
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launching SCUD missiles against Israel.  Though weak in military utility, this act 
demonstrated Iraq's willingness to use the SCUD as a weapon of terror (if armed with a 
biochemical warhead) and as a weapon of provocation against smaller regional countries.  
The U.S. countered by supplying Israel with Patriot anti-missile batteries.  Additionally, 
the U.S. initiated "SCUD Hunt" missions to find the elusive, mobile transporter-erector-
launchers (TEL) and defeat the threat before it left the ground. 
 The Iraqis had become very skillful at minimizing the time required to move the 
launchers into location and prepare the SCUD for launch.  Contrary to the Soviets, who 
used the SCUD's predecessor, the R-17, and usually spent 90 minutes to set up, the Iraqi's 
streamlined their efforts to yield a turn-around time of approximately 30 minutes.   
 Thirteen years later, during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), planners faced the 
same threat as before – evasive launchers capable of delivering biochemical payloads.  
Because the problem wasn't new, the difficulty came in deciding how many and what 
kind of resources to dedicate to solving the problem on the battlefield (i.e., hunting, 
finding and destroying a mobile launcher) – a decision we are still trying to make today. 
 ACC is sponsoring this research and wishes to gain insight into how sensors 
affect the SCUD hunt targeting process and the kill chain.  Without sensors onboard 
aircraft, satellites, etc., the acquisition and identification of SCUD targets would take 
longer thereby lengthening the time required to complete the kill chain.  Hence, our 
research will focus on the “detecting” role sensors play in the SCUD hunt mission.  In 
terms of Blue and Red, the Red force agents will be mobile SCUD TELs that hide, so as 
not to be detected, and then resurface to fire a SCUD.  The Blue force agents will be 
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modeled as multi-role fighters, UAVs and satellites all trying to detect the SCUD TELs 
and relay that detection to the appropriate agent for engagement. 
SEAS “UseCases” 
 Our SEAS Warfile will be composed using two popular methods: 1) Writing the 
file from scratch and 2) Utilizing (with proper citation) well-established code.  The use of 
both methods will provide the benefit of tailoring the Warfile code to contain exactly 
what is needed and desired, while utilizing other code allows the flexibility of adding key 
agent components, from trusted sources, and saves the overall time required to develop a 
mission-level combat model. 
 Referring to the former method above, the “UseCases” which are included in any 
version of SEAS software will be an excellent point of reference for code.  Some of the 









 Many of these include segments of code that directly apply to this research.  For 
instance, GMTI_Qs_SAR contains pertinent satellite information that is difficult to 
construct, or obtain – orbits, sensor parameters, etc. 
Air Force Research Laboratory 
 The Air Force Research Laboratory Air Vehicles Directorate (AFRL/VACD) has 
also done work that is useful to my research.  Their work on modeling morphing 
technology, as applied to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), focuses on concepts that are 
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also part of my model.  Mainly, the UAVs that AFRL/VACD (Brown and Martin, 
2005:15) modeled contained segments of their missions where they loitered waiting for a 
target; segments where they tracked a target; and segments where they left one target in 
search of another.  Our model will contain each of these but for both UAVs and multi-
role fighters.  For example, in our model, UAVs will be out patrolling a tactical area of 
operations (TAO), when they detect a target (either by their own sensor or queued by the 
Blue Air Operations Center (AOC)) they will precede to the target area for further 
investigation.  Once the target is identified, the commanding base will be notified in-turn 
notifying the patrolling multi-role fighters.  The multi-role fighters will then proceed to 
the target location.  The concepts that AFRL/VACD worked on will contribute to the 
knowledge base used in our model. 
 Although both methods of code composition will contribute their share to this 
research, the majority of the underlying scenario code will be original effort.  This is 
mainly due to the time it takes to strip useful code out of another body of work and then 
apply it to our code in a seamless way.  It became apparent, early on, that building the 
scenario from the bottom up would be faster and easier than relying too heavily on 
previously developed code.  After getting a substantial start on our scenario, it was 
necessary to call the SEAS developers for guidance in the code.  SPARTA, Inc.’s Eric 
Frisco aided in the development of this model and has become a valuable resource for 
this research.  His knowledge and expertise in SEAS, let alone modeling and simulation 
in general, have helped streamline the code and have clarified the methodologies we need 
in place to effectively capture our Measures of Performance. 
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Measures of Performance 
 In order to establish a common understanding, some definitions must be given of 
the terminology that will play an important role in the following text.  First, we are 
attempting to capture data on specific performance parameters of our modeled system.  
Thus, we use the term Measure of Performance (MOP) to identify said parameters.  
These MOPs are very detailed and come in the form of a statement because they can 
aggregate up to support higher-level measures of effectiveness and answer critical 
operational issues.  An example of one of our MOPs is "Find the average number of 
targets destroyed [across all runs] before being able to fire." 
 After conversations with ACC, several MOPs were established.  As with all 
models, obtaining the data required to develop the MOPs is a matter of output.  Some of 
our MOP data will come from normal SEAS output files and will be analyzed using the 
SEAS Postprocessor – which is an Excel-based macro – while other data may require 
unique experimental design and special code to capture it. 
 ACC’s main question is: Can the probability of identification (Pid) and probability 
of detection (Pd) be developed for each type of sensor modeled?  Following on that, ACC 
would like to know 1) if Pid and Pd make a difference to aircraft routing, and 2) if 
degradation can be captured due to Pid and Pd?  That is, if the blue forces cover the 
operational area 100% of the time, 24/7, does the application of Pid and Pd values degrade 
the 100% coverage down to, say, 40% mission success of finding the targets of interest?    
The complexity of these questions will lead us to develop our model to the best extent 
possible in order to provide insight.  Some of this insight begins with understanding the 
inputs required by SEAS.  For instance, probability of detection, Pd , is a direct input 
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required by SEAS in order to reference a Pd table; however, probability of identification, 
Pid, is not a direct input and its derivation is beyond the scope of this research.  Thus, 
unless we consider a system of systems approach, the Pd's of the sensors modeled will 
remain as required inputs and not derived.  As for aircraft routing, our Blue Force 
CONOPS is the driving force behind the engagement of the Red Forces.  In other words, 
even though we have given each F-16C a Pd of 100% and Pk of 100% against the 
SCUD_TELs, the F-16Cs are not looking for those targets against which they have a 
better Pd or Pk, they are simply flying CAP until rerouted to target locations broadcast by 
the AOC.  Thus, their flight paths are completely stochastic and will change dynamically 
as their local target lists are updated.  Moreover, it should be noted that giving our 
sensors a Pd and Pk both equal to 100% is, in essence, defining our sensors as definite 
range law devices.  A definite range law device is one where a target cannot be detected 
outside the device's maximum detection range because no probability exists for that 
instance.  However, any target within the device's detection range – to include distance, 
azimuth and elevation – will be detected with certainty.  Recall from Figure 2.3, the 
sensors we apply in SEAS have as inputs a minimum detection range, a break range, a 
maximum detection range, azimuth width, elevation minimum and elevation maximum.  
Any target that falls within bounds defined by those six sensor parameters will be 
detected with probability = 1. 
 The process of identifying a target can vary by situation.  Taylor (2000) describes 
the target identification process as occurring in 4 different phases. 
1.  detection (target detected at such a level of resolution/discrimination 
that observer can distinguish an object of military interest that is 
foreign to the background in its field of view, e.g. distinguish a vehicle 
from a bush) 
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2.  aimpoint (target detected at such a level of resolution/discrimination 
that observer can distinguish an object by its class, e.g. a tracked 
vehicle versus a helicopter or a wheeled vehicle; observer can thus 
establish an aimpoint on the object) 
3.  recognition (observer can categorize targets discriminated at aimpoint 
within a given class, e.g. recognize a tank versus an armored personnel 
carrier in the tracked vehicle class) 
4.  identification (observer can distinguish between specific recognized 
target models, e.g. a T-72 tank versus a T-80) (Taylor, 2000: 929) 
 
Sensors in SEAS process targets at the "identification" level – that is, the sensors detect 
every target against which they have a Pd value (in our case Pd = 1) and Pid is assumed 
perfect.  This is due to each agent having a long name associated with it and which 
uniquely identifies it.  The long name includes the agent's parentage all the way back to 
the force.  For instance, a SCUD_TEL is a Red force agent, but when observing the 
Sensor Detection file to see which SCUD_TEL a satellite detected at a particular time you 
would see the SCUD_TEL's long name appearing in this format: 
Side.Force.Unit#.Agent#.  For example, Red.RedC3I.Red_HQ#1.SCUD_TEL#14.  
 In addition to Pid and Pd, ACC would like to know: What is the time interval it 
takes to make an observation?  This should include the time it takes the sensor to 
complete its mission (i.e. Find-Fix-Track-Target (F2T2) and take a picture) and the time 
for the operator to read and interpret that mission data to make a decision as to whether 
an airborne asset should be tasked or not.  Although we are not modeling the human-in-
the-loop aspect behind this question, our model gives insight into the average detection 
times. 
 Narrowing this wide range of MOPs down to a reasonable number that will 
provide excellent insight and a solid foundation for future work, we will consider 
following MOPs: 
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1. The number of initial target detections, by any sensor, within two hours of 
the first target detection. 
2. The proportion of targets destroyed before being able to fire. 
3. The proportion of targets destroyed by the end of the 24-hour period of 
operations. 
4. Which Blue Force agent detected which target and at what time did the 
detection occur? 
 
Table 1 summarizes the MOPs we are collecting data for.  The column headings provide 
a very brief description of the design of experiments – please refer to the "Model Design" 
section for more discussion.  Chapter Four contains the results of our analysis on each of 
the MOPs; as well, the standard descriptive statistics (means, confidence intervals, etc.) 
are presented to support the insight gained from our analysis. 
Table 1 Summary of the MOPs 
 Baseline Case 
(All Agents) 
Test Case 1 
(No F-16Cs) 
Test Case 2 
(No UAVs) 
Test Case 3 
(No Satellites) 
MOP 1 X X X X 
MOP 2 X  X X 
MOP 3 X  X X 
MOP 4 X  X  
 
Verification of the Model 
 Verification of our model will be accomplished as the model development 
progresses.  Verification of a model involves ensuring that the model coding and 
structure are correct; i.e. did we build the model correctly (Banks, 2005: 354)?  The 
driving force behind our model verification is the input from subject matter experts 
(SME).  The SEAS model developer – SPARTA, Inc. – has been crucial in filling that 
role.  When new code is added to the model, they have made themselves available to 
view the addition and make recommendations.  In addition to helping with the model 
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code, they have contributed their knowledge of sensor capabilities and how SEAS 
processes information. 
Validation of the Model 
 Validation of our model is the process of making sure the model represents the 
simulated system as accurately as possible and that all the correct pieces to answer the 
questions being asked are present in the model.  According to Banks et al. (2005: 354), 
the goal of the validation process is twofold: 
1. To produce a model that represents true system 
behavior closely enough for the model to be used as a 
substitute for the actual system for the purpose of 
experimenting with the system, analyzing system 
behavior, and predicting system performance; 
2. To increase to an acceptable level the credibility of the 
model, so that the model will be used by managers and 
other decision makers. 
In other words, did we build the correct model?  The CONOPS will play a significant 
role in answering that question.  Thus, we employed guidance from an experienced F-16 
pilot whose operational experience includes being an instructor pilot qualified in the 
Block 42/52/50 and flying combat time in the SEAD/Air Superiority missions.  Passing a 
pilot's "gut check" is a major step toward the seal of approval for our model.  Once all 
agents have been programmed and the CONOPS are in place, we will run the model for a 
number of operators, whose Air Force pilot experience qualifies them as experts, and see 




 The Warfile for our model is designed in two major stages.  The first stage 
involves a small test case to verify all communication and sensor-to-shooter links are 
working.  Additionally, all logic is scrutinized making sure that the planes fly at the 
appropriate times, the satellites are passing overhead, the UAVs are following the correct 
TAOs, etc.  Once the test case is working properly, the second stage contains numerous 
cases where the number of targets remains constant (see Red Forces discussion below), 
but the combinations of multi-role fighters, UAVs and satellites are changed to perform 
sensitivity analysis on the force structure.  Since the Warfile uses UAVs, multi-role 
fighters and satellites as its agents, the study cases are designed selecting the agents in 
pairs.  The number of combinations beyond the baseline case is then three.  The 
following list is the breakout of those three combinations representing the various force 
structures, starting with the baseline case: 
- Baseline case = UAVs, Multi-role fighters, Satellites 
- 1st Case = Satellites, UAVs, No Multi-role fighters 
- 2nd Case = Satellites, Multi-role fighters, No UAVs 
- 3rd Case = UAVs, Multi-role fighters, No Satellites 
 
 Another option we initially considered for our model design is to leave all three 
blue platforms (satellites, UAVs and planes) in each case, but to then vary the number of 
each type.  This approach allows us to get a better understanding of the contribution of 
each agent type and how that contribution affects the MOPs.  After some preliminary 
design analysis on this option, however, we concluded our current outlined approach 
provides a sufficient level of fidelity and insight given our time constraints. 
 Additionally, two different sensor types are applied as devices to the agent 
platforms.  The following design matrix, Table 2, identifies what sensor is assigned to 
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which agent.  Note that the sensor called “PilotEyes” is our representation of giving the 
F-16C agent the ability to get a visual on a target.  This was added after conversations 
with Mr. Dave Berg (2006) in which he indicated that an attack aircraft pilot would be 
able to discriminate a real target from a decoy when the target is within his visual range. 
Table 2. Platform/Sensor Capability Matrix 
 Satellites UAV F-16C
GMTI X X  
SAR X X X 
PilotEyes   X 
 
Table 2 needs just a little more clarification.  The capability of the sensors to detect a 
moving target is handled explicitly as an input parameter on each sensor.  We chose this 
approach to the sensors to allow for flexibility in our design; thus, we did not design such 
detailed sensors that the data output would be overwhelming.  Figure 5 illustrates the 
sensor onboard each of the F-16Cs.  The arrows indicate the important input parameters 
on this sensor making it unique from the other sensors modeled.  Although it is built from 
the generic sensor template, the design points identified make is suitable for the mission 
that we have applied it to. 
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Figure 5. F-16C onboard SAR sensor 
Force Structures: The Red Forces 
 We have now arrived at the point where we need to layout what each of the forces 
(Blue, Red and Sim_Manager) looks like and how they are structured.  Since the 
Sim_Manager is the smallest force, let us start with it.  The Sim_Manager has no 
subordinate agents and is not a combat force like the Red and Blue forces.  It is used as a 
programming construct for ease and traceability by placing all the code for generating the 
Red force's random starting locations within its domain.  The Red force is a very simple 
structure: it contains one parent agent and subordinate agents – known as children – see 
Figure 6.  The parent agent is the Red_HQ and is the Command, Control, 
Communications and Information (C3I) hub for the Red forces.  Due to the nature of this 
scenario, the Red_HQ is a very benign agent.  It contains no communication links to its 
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children and contains no weapons in and of itself.  The Red_HQ deploys to Baghdad at 
the start of the simulation. 
 
Figure 6. Red Force's Command Structure 
 The children of the Red_HQ are the SCUD_TEL agents, and are by far the most 
complex agents in this Warfile.  The complexity of the SCUD_TELs is due to the 
numerous targets with all with their mobile capability to evade detection.  According to 
ACC, the real-world problem has two kinds of targets: real and decoy (Berg, 2006).  A 
typical scenario would include a few real targets and perhaps ten to twenty times more 
decoys.  For this initial research, we only model real targets (30 for our scenarios), but 
have included the logic in our code to model decoys in future efforts.  Hence, the real 
SCUD_TELs are those that move and fire at the Blue Air Operations Center (named 
B_AOC).  Figure 7 shows the Location_Generator TPL from our code that governs the 
initial placement of the SCUD_TELs.  The random time of appearance and placement of 
the SCUD_TEL agents within the area of operations (AOO) both occur according to a 
Uniform distribution; additionally, the first line of Figure 7 states that this random 
generation is only to occur on the first Monte Carlo run.  That is, over all the runs 
performed on any test case, the starting locations of the SCUD_TELs are the same every 
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time.  This is due to the location generator writing the initial locations to an external text 
file named RealTargetLocs.txt and then reading those locations at the beginning of every 
subsequent run. 
 
Figure 7. Location Generator Tactical Programming Language 
 Once the SCUD_TEL locations are generated and the agents appear in the AOO, 
the active SCUD_TELs then begin moving a random direction and distance, according to 
another Uniform distribution, along SCUDArray – an array created to hold the directions 
and distances for each SCUD_TEL – as can be seen in Figure 8.  Their movement is 
coded at the agent level not at the parent, or Red_HQ, level.  Often times, the behavior of 
subordinate agents is captured, or controlled, at the parent-agent level and it filters down 
     !! only do this on first Monte Carlo trial 
               If war->Iteration == 1 & $REAL_TARGET_FILE == 0 
                    Open Write, "RealTargetLocs.txt"                    !! open external text file to write to 
                    While i < $NUM_REAL_TARGETS 
                         While Inside("Iraq", rnloc) != 1 
                              !!rnlong = 43.5  !! central longitude 
                              !!rnlat = 33     !! central latitude 
                              !!rnloc = location(rnlong, rnlat, 0) + 500*uniform() * vector(360*uniform()) 
                              rnlong = 35.6 + 16.6*uniform()       !! theater lonmin = 35.6, lonmax = 52.2, 
        delta = 16.6 
                              rnlat = 28.8 + 8.9*uniform()         !! theater latmin = 28.8, latmax = 37.7, 
        delta = 8.9 
                              rnloc = location(rnlong, rnlat, 0) !!+ 500*uniform() * vector(360*uniform()) 
                         EndWhile 1 
                         SCUDArray[i] = rnloc 
                         rnloc = location(0,0,0)                     !! reset rnloc to 0 
                         Write "RealTargetLocs.txt", SCUDArray[i]        !! write location to external file 
                         i = i + 1 
                    EndWhile 1 
                    Close "RealTargetLocs.txt" 
               Else 
                    Open Read, "RealTargetLocs.txt"     !! open target file 
                    j = 0 
                    While j < $NUM_REAL_TARGETS 
                         Read "RealTargetLocs.txt", SCUDArray[j]      !! read target locations from file 
                         j = j + 1 
                    EndWhile 1 
                    Close "RealTargetLocs.txt" 
               EndIf  
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to the children; however, for programming ease, it was decided that each SCUD_TEL 
should control its own random movement.  The mobile SCUD_TELs are equipped with 
SCUD missiles, are programmed to stop for at least 30 minutes (long enough to setup and 
launch), and they fire at the Blue Base only once during each run.  The SCUDs have no 
effect on the Blue Base and are there only for completeness and to ensure that we don’t 
miss an opportunity to catch data, for example, on a TEL that was not targeted and fired a 
lethal weapon. 
 
Figure 8. Random Movement Tactical Programming Language 
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Force Structures: The Blue Forces 
 The Blue forces are the main players in our scenario and it is the Blue side for 
which our MOPs have been developed.  The Blue side has more components than the 
Red side and is also quite complex – but in its entirety, not so much for any single type of 
agent.  For our Blue Force discussion, please refer to Figure 9 below. 
 
Figure 9. Blue Force Command Structure 
 Similar to the Red force, the Blue force is governed by a C3I headquarters named 
B_AOC.  Unlike the Red force, however, the B_AOC does have communication links in 
place between itself and all the subordinate Blue agents.  It is important to note that the 
satellite constellation feeding data to the B_AOC is “owned” by the Blue Air Force not by 
46 
the B_AOC.  Thus, the satellites are not subordinate to the B_AOC and cannot take orders 
from the B_AOC.  The B_AOC owns, as its subordinate agents, the F-16Cs and the 
UAVs.  As stated, the B_AOC has communication links to these agents and relays 
SCUD_TEL target information it receives from the satellites to the UAVs and F-16s.  
Similarly, when the UAVs detect a SCUD_TEL they relay that information to the B_AOC 
who in-turn notifies the F-16s.  Figure 9 also shows the break-out of the devices 
(communication, weapons and sensors) owned by each type of agent. 
 The driving force behind the Blue force agents’ behaviors is their CONOPS.  
There are several CONOPS assumptions at play in our scenario.  First, is that the 
constellation of nine Blue satellites will relay any SCUD_TEL target information to the 
B_AOC.  The satellites are equipped with both Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) 
and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) sensors.  The GMTI sensors are flagged to detect 
only moving targets and the SAR sensors will only detect static targets.  Upon receiving 
target information, the B_AOC passes the target information to the UAVs that are out 
flying surveillance missions covering specified regions of the AOO.  The UAV 
responsible for the TAO within which a target appears will depart its TAO and fly to 
surveil the target.  When the UAV detects the target it will notify the B_AOC.  The UAV 
will then loiter around the target and, if it begins moving, follow it until it goes into 
defilade or until the F-16s arrive and take over operations.  The F-16s, out flying Combat 
Air Patrol (CAP) missions in the AOO, will receive the target data from the B_AOC, 
break off from their current mission profile and proceed to the target location.  Because 
the F-16 pilot can visually determine if the target is an active threat, when the pilot gets a 
visual on the SCUD_TEL he/she will begin the process of determining whether or not to 
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fire at the target (Berg, 2006).  In order to capture attrition of the Red forces, we have 
added a probability of kill for the F-16 against the SCUD_TEL so that when the 
SCUD_TEL is detected and is within range of the F-16, a JSOW will be fired to remove 
the SCUD_TEL agent from the Local Target List (LTL) and, consequently, the scenario 
run.  This data will play an invaluable part in the post-processing of the descriptive 
statistics. 
 Figure 10 below shows the AOO with its three UAVs orbiting their TAOs and the 
three F-16 CAPs.  Notice the screen shot was taken before any targets have randomly 
appeared in the AOO.  Figure 11 reveals an increased ops tempo due to the active targets 
now out of defilade and the UAVs departing their TAOs to discriminate/surveil the 
targets.  Also note, in Figure 3.7, the communication links from the B_AOC to the UAVs 
and the F-16s.  The communications links from the B_AOC are updating all Blue agents' 
LTL; however, the UAVs and F-16s only respond to those targets within their TAO and 
CAP area of responsibility respectively.  Thus, neither a UAV nor an F-16C in the top 
region will respond to a detected target in the middle or lower region. 
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Figure 10. UAV TAOs and F-16 CAPs 
 
Figure 11. Communication links from B_AOC to UAVs and F-16s 
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Figure 12. Satellite detecting targets in AOO 
 From the satellite's perspective, Figure 12 demonstrates several more aspects of 
the model.  First, observe the satellite detecting eight of the targets in the AOO – it 
happens that three of them were on the move so the GMTI scored those detections.  Also, 
note the moon in the upper right corner of the screen shot.  This indicates the shot was 
taken during nighttime operations.  The dashed lines emanating from the center of the 
satellite are the target detection lines.  The resulting communication lines from the 
B_AOC to the UAVs and F-16s are indications that all sensor-to-shooter links are 
working. 
 Figure 13 also shows target detections by a satellite, but it also demonstrates one 
of SEAS's unique and powerful capabilities.  In order to capture the screen shot, the 
simulated Earth was rotated and zoomed out. 
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Figure 13. SEAS zoom feature showing target detections by a satellite 
Conclusion 
  Though the major analysis occurs after the model is developed, it is crucial to 
have a game plan in place while building the model; and since all agents in our scenario 
play vital roles, every effort has been made to ensure that appropriate levels of detail are 
reflected in their characteristics and in their CONOPS.  This chapter provides the 
necessary foundation for understanding the construction of the scenario to be run in 
SEAS.  Particular attention should be paid to the MOPs as we are looking to answer 
specific questions from the sponsor, while at the same time, exploring some creative 
avenues that might provide new and interesting insight to the system and its components.  
In the next chapter, we will implement our design and run our simulation.  The resulting 
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data for each test case will then be post-processed as we take steps toward the MOP data 
collection. 
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IV. Analysis and Results 
Introduction 
 This chapter describes the post-processing analysis of the data and the results we 
obtained from that analysis.  We start by describing each test case in more detail and then 
address the measures of performance (MOP) that we collected data on.  With the MOP 
discussion, we will present our analysis and conclusions. 
 Flexibility in coding became a key driving force behind the development of our 
warfile.  A generally accepted practice in most computer programming languages is the 
ability to "comment out" lines of code so they are not processed as part of the actual 
program.  An example is to comment out personal notes detailing what the program is 
doing at that place in the code.  This was an important facet of our coding because our 
design of experiments called for removing certain agents at different times.  One 
approach to this was to physically comment out the agents that were not going to 
participate in the next scenario.  However, that would have been extremely time 
consuming and labor intensive.  Instead, we defined our design of experiments variables 
early in the coding so that when we desired to change test cases we only needed to 
change one number and not have to comment out sections of code.  Removing an agent 
from the Baseline Test Case required enabling or disabling both its sensors and 
communications devices.  The sensors were enabled/disabled at the agent level; however, 
Figure 14 shows how we partially defined the four test cases based on the communication 
devices that were transmitting or receiving.  Figure 15 demonstrates how we were then 
able to change one number to switch between dramatically different test cases. 
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Figure 14. Sensor and Comm Device Instantiation for Design of Experiments 
 
 
Figure 15. How to change the Design of Experiments 
One of the capabilities desired of model, as discussed with Air Combat Command 
(ACC), was the ability to either generate a set of initial target locations or read in a set of 
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known target locations.  To accommodate this, our model was designed to operate by 
either means.  In other words, the set of initial target locations implemented in the model 
can either be randomly generated or it can be read in from a text file.  This raises the 
issue of variance in the resulting data.  For instance, if, at the start of each run, the initial 
target starting locations were randomly generated, then there would be a large amount of 
variance across all the runs for the starting location of each individual agent.  In order to 
control the variance as discussed, we randomly generated a text file containing thirty 
target locations.  We then locked the code to only read said file for every run of every test 
case.  The trade-off here was that we reduced the variance, but we introduced correlation 
between all the runs.  This correlation is in no way a threat to our model's performance 
and was dealt with by means of a paired-t test in our analysis.  The next issue we needed 
to answer was how many runs to perform for each test case.  As an initial cut, and 
assuming our data was approximately normally distributed, we started with n = 30 runs – 
where each run simulates 24 hours of operations.  Using SEAS version 3.5 on a Dell 
Dimension 8300 desktop computer running a 2.60 GHz Intel Pentium 4 CPU with 512 
MB of RAM, the range of time it took to run any test case was 58 seconds to 96 seconds.  
Our warfile is small enough at 1884 lines of code that the computing cost of performing 
30 runs was negligible.  However, after running the early phases of the model for 30 runs, 
the resulting amount of data overwhelmed the SEAS Excel-based post-processor, as it 
was needed for our efforts.  Figure 16 is a plot produced by the post-processor for the 
baseline test case over 30 runs.  This was produced to capture data for MOP 1: the 
number of initial target detections, by any sensor, within two hours of the first target 
detection.  In order to sort and filter the data, we needed to graph "time" and "sensor" on 
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the x-axis with "targets" and "run" on the y-axis.  Keep in mind this filtering method 
returns all of the detections by all sensors available, for each minute of each run, during 
that two-hour time period.  As can be seen, the data is extremely dense; in fact, Excel 
doesn't contain enough columns (it stops at 26*26 = 676) to import all the filtering 
parameters and consequently removed the "run" parameter from the y-axis.  Keeping in 
mind the plot was rotated for clarity, what we see below is read as follows:  for a given 
time step on the x-axis, a bar indicates the number of times a sensor detected a given 
target in that same time step across all 30 runs.  See the text box in Figure 16 for an 
example. 
 
Figure 16. 30 Run data capture for MOP 1 
56 
We performed a normality check on the baseline data for ten runs and found that 
it was approximately normally distributed.  The remaining test cases showed some 
departure from normality, but not enough to warrant further investigation.  Thus, we 
reduced the number of runs down to ten so as to generate output files that were more 
manageable for our computing resources.  Once able to import the data into the post-
processor, we could manipulate and sort the data to obtain the values needed to address 
our MOPs.   The final portion of the post-processing was taking the resulting data for 
each test case and calculating descriptive statistics such as expected value and paired-t 
test confidence intervals. 
Baseline Test Case 
 The baseline test case is the scenario against which all the other test cases were 
compared.  Thus, it is this test case that contains all agents represented in the warfile.  For 
the Blue Force, those agents are the satellites, UAVs and F-16s.  For the Red Force, those 
agents are the SCUD TELs.  All Pd's were set to 1 for optimal detection within the sensor 
range parameters as discussed earlier, and the Pk for the F-16s against the SCUD_TEL 
agents was set to 1 – similarly, for all weapon range parameters. 
One of the most important issues we focused on when comparing other test cases 
against the baseline was the CONOPS and the effectiveness of the force structure.  In the 
baseline test case, the Air Operations Center (AOC) was the command, control, computer 
and information (C3I) hub for the Blue Force, and all targeting information was sent from 
the source agent (the detecting sensor) to the sink agent (the acting sensor) through the 
AOC.  For instance, if a satellite was the first to detect a SCUD_TEL, it relayed that 
information to the blue AOC (B_AOC).  The B_AOC then sent that information out to the 
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UAV that was responsible for the region in which the target was present.  Thus far, the 
satellite was the source agent and the UAV was the sink agent, and all sensor detections 
were transferred over communications links through the AOC.  Once the UAV arrived at 
the target location and detected the target, it effectively became the source agent and 
relayed the confirmed target location back to the AOC.  The AOC then tasked the 
appropriate flight of F-16s (the sink agents) to break off their combat air patrol (CAP) 
and fly to the target location to destroy it.  The process of detection information flowing 
from source agent to sink agent through the AOC was the same regardless of which agent 
was acting as the source agent.  The one exception was if the source agent was an F-16.  
When that was the case, the F-16 acted upon its own goal set and destroyed the 
SCUD_TEL without being explicitly tasked by the AOC.  As we work through the 
various test cases, note the changes in the Blue Force CONOPS.  These changes, due to 
which agents were present in the scenario, provided interesting insight to the force 
structure. 
Test Case 1 – No F-16s 
 Our first change to the baseline test case was to remove the F-16s from the 
scenario.  Physically, they were still visible as the simulation played out; however, their 
sensors and all communication devices were turned off.  Thus, they were effectively 
rendered missing from the scenario.  To verify this, we checked the Sensor Detection 
Report generated by the processing of the warfile.  We needed to make sure there were 
no detections made by any of the F-16s at any time during a run execution.  Though it 
seemed redundant to turn off both the sensors and the communication devices, it was 
quite possible that, if only the communication devices were turned off, leaving the 
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sensors on, and a SCUD_TEL drove under one of the F-16 CAPS, the SCUD_TEL would 
be detected and destroyed by a JSOW launched from an F-16 flying overhead.  As it 
turned out, we did indeed catch one of these "kills" and so to ensure this did not happen 
again, we turned off both the F-16 sensors and communication devices. 
 The source to sink concept still applies in Test Case 1 but only to the satellites and 
UAVs as the detecting agents.  For instance, when a satellite detected a SCUD_TEL it 
relayed that information back to the B_AOC which, in turn, tasked the appropriate UAV 
to verify the target – the sensor chain stopped here.  Because there were no F-16s, this 
test case could only be used for certain MOPs as discussed later. 
Test Case 2 – No UAVs 
 Test Case 2 only involves the target detection interactions between the satellites 
and the F-16s.  This test case is very similar to Test Case 1 in that the sensor and 
communication devices on the UAVs were turned off and the UAVs still flew their 
tactical areas of operations (TAO), but they could not detect any targets.  Nor could they 
receive any targeting information from the AOC. 
 The sensor-to-shooter link was as follows: Either a satellite or an F-16 could 
detect a target.  If an F-16 detected the target, it would destroy it without an explicit 
tasking from the B_AOC.  If a satellite detected a target, the B_AOC would pass that 
target information to the appropriate flight of F-16s.  The F-16 closest to the target would 
take a wingman and go destroy the target.  The results from this test case were very 
interesting and generate insightful discussion later in the text. 
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Test Case 3 – No Satellites 
 Our last test case rounds out the experimental design we used in setting up our 
study.  This test case involved only the UAVs and the F-16s.  Again, the satellite sensors 
and communication devices were turned off, yet they were still in orbit.  The sensor-to-
shooter link could start with either the UAVs or the F-16s.  If the F-16s detected a target, 
again, they fired without being tasked.  If the UAVs had the first detection, they 
transmitted that information to the F-16s via the AOC.  The F-16s would then fly to the 
target to destroy it. 
In the next few sections, we will look at our analysis approach and then address 
each MOP and see how each test case applied to that MOP.  Table 3 gives a summary of 
which test cases support the different MOPs.  Refer to that table for the following 
discussion.  We will also present the results of our analysis for each of the MOPs and 
discuss our conclusions. 
Table 3. MOP to Test Case Mapping 
 Baseline 
(All Agents) 
Test Case 1 
(No F-16s) 
Test Case 2 
(No UAVs) 
Test Case 3 
(No Satellites) 
MOP 1 X X X X 
MOP 2 X  X X 
MOP 3 X  X X 
MOP 4 X  X  
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Overview of Analysis 
 The overarching premise throughout this research has been to determine whether 
changes to the Blue force structure alter its effectiveness.  The most valuable way to 
determine if statistically significant differences exist between our various test cases is 
through the use of paired-t confidence intervals.  More specifically, we used a paired-t 
test because of correlation introduced by using the same starting random number seed for 
each test case and same starting locations for the targets in each run (of each test case).  
The paired-t method utilizes the differences between the means of two populations 
assumed (hypothesized) to be similar.  Therefore, we start our analysis by defining jZ  as 
the difference between the random variable outputs ( jX  and jY ) from the j
th run of each 
of our four populations (e.g. Baseline Test Case, Test Case 1, Test Case 2 and Test Case 
3) taken pair-wise. 
 jjj YXZ −= ,   j = 1,2,…,10 (1) 
We fix jX  as the random variable output from the Baseline Test Case.  jY  is then the 
random variable output from any of the other test cases at the time of comparison.  For 
instance, according to Table 3, MOP 3 involved comparing the Baseline Test Case 
against Test Case 2 and the Baseline Test Case against Test Case 3.  More detail is 
provided when the individual MOPs are addressed.  The next variable of interest is the 
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For MOP 2 and MOP 3, we needed to consider the attrition of the target set.  The 
continual change in the number of targets implied that we needed to look at the 
proportion of targets for each of those MOPs.  The results of these Bernoulli trials have a 
variance of  
 )ˆ1(ˆ pp −   (5) 










.  (6) 
The resulting confidence intervals are provided in the discussion for each MOP. 
MOP 1 
 MOP 1 was defined as "The number of initial target detections, by any sensor, 
within two hours of the first target detection." 
Analysis 
Reference Table 3 for the populations we compared.  Table 4 identifies the lower 
and upper bounds for the 95% paired-t confidence intervals we developed for MOP 1. 
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Table 4. MOP 1 Confidence Intervals 
Paired-t 95% Confidence Intervals with Statistical Significance 
Baseline Versus 
 
C.I. Lower Bound C.I. Upper Bound 
Statistically 
Significant?
Test Case 1 1.00 -2.03 4.03 No 
Test Case 2 -0.20 -2.68 2.28 No 
Test Case 3 9.80 7.70 11.90 Yes 
 
For the Baseline versus Test Case 1, we see that the confidence interval includes 
zero meaning there is no statistical difference (at 95%) between the two modeled 
scenarios.  Appendix B contains the actual per-run values for all comparisons.  Figure 17 
illustrates the initial detection count for the first two hours in the Baseline and Test Case 
1 respectively.  Recall that in Test Case 1, the F-16s were removed from the scenario 
resulting in no initial detections from the F-16s and fewer initial detections overall.  As 
can be seen, there are times when the Baseline obtained better results, and there are times 
when Test Case 1 performed better.  The fact that there was often similar behavior for 
similar runs leaves us with no clear distinction between the two cases and thus confirms 




Figure 17. No F-16 Detections (2hrs) 
For the Baseline case versus Test Case 2, the confidence interval again includes 
zero, so there is no statistical difference between the two force structures.  However, we 
see that the average number of detections slightly increased in Test Case 2.  Consider the 
scenario: the UAVs were removed leaving the F-16s getting updated target information 
from the satellites (via the AOC).  Now consider that there are 18 F-16s in the scenario 
and when they received independent target information, they broke off their CAP in pairs 
to pursue the first target on their LTL.  So there were effectively nine sensors at work in 
the air space in this scenario versus only three when the UAVs were present, as in Test 




Figure 18. No UAV Detections (2 hrs)  
Additionally, Test Case 2 revealed how the UAVs could be a bottleneck in the 
elimination of time critical targets (TCT).  This was because the F-16s flew CAP until 
targets were verified by the UAVs.  At that time, and only at that time, would the F-16s 
depart their CAP to destroy a target.  Although the F-16s detected a target if they flew 
over it while on CAP or ingressing/egressing from a target on their LTL, the majority of 
their detection efforts originated from the information they received from the UAVs. 
In the Baseline case versus Test Case 3 the confidence interval does not contain 
zero.  Here we can definitively state there is a difference between the force structure, as it 
exists in the Baseline, and the force structure without any satellites.  This is a trivial case 
because it goes without saying that the satellites have the highest number of initial 
detections over the 24-hours of operations.  Figure 19 illustrates the number of initial 




Figure 19. No Satellite Detections (2 hrs) 
MOP 2 
 MOP 2 was defined as "The proportion of targets destroyed before being able to 
fire." 
Analysis 
Reference Table 3 for the populations we compared.  Table 5 identifies the lower 
and upper bounds for the 95% proportion confidence intervals we developed.  Due to the 
nature of this MOP, we needed to recognize two things: first, attrition is involved in this 
MOP causing the probability of detection to change over the course of the 24-hour 
operations; second, the number of targets destroyed before firing would never exceed the 
total number of targets in the scenario.  Therefore we derive point and interval estimates 
of the proportion of targets (out of 30) destroyed before being able to fire. 
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Table 5. MOP 2 Confidence Intervals 





Baseline 0.0113 0.7420 0.3767 N/A 
Test Case 2 0.1502 0.9032 0.5267 No 
Test Case 3 0.0 0.6500 0.3033 No 
 
 As is seen in Table 5 the average proportion of "kills" increased from the Baseline 
to Test Case 2, however, since the confidence intervals overlap we are unable to detect a 
statistically significant difference at 95% confidence.  Recall, Test Case 2 operated 
without UAVs.  We hypothesize that we removed the bottleneck, as discussed for MOP1, 
and allowed the F-16s to respond more rapidly to the TCTs.  At this point, the F-16s are 
coded to break off their CAP, in pairs (a flight leader and a wingman), and pursue the 
latest target added to the LTL (as long as the target was within their area of 
responsibility).  Without the UAVs, the nine pairs of F-16s were able to pursue nine 
different targets simultaneously.  If there were less than nine new targets on the LTL, 
then pairs formed for the current targets and the remaining F-16s went with the last pair.  
For instance, say there were six targets on the LTL and each CAP region contained two 
of them.  In all three CAP regions, one pair of F-16s would pursue one target and the 
remaining four F-16s would pursue the second target.  Figure 20 graphs the kill count for 
the number of targets that were destroyed in each run before being able to fire. 
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Figure 20. Kills Before Firing With No UAVs 
 When we compared the Baseline against Test Case 3, we didn't see a statistically 
significant difference between the two populations.  Table 5 depicts this numerically by 
the confidence intervals and Figure 21 graphically shows the number of targets destroyed 
in the Baseline and Test Case 3. 
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Figure 21. Kills Before Firing With No Satellites 
We thought Test Case 3 would be a trivial case.  Our initial hypothesis was that 
when the satellites were removed from the scenario – eliminating a majority of the initial 
detections – we expected to see an overwhelming decrease in bombs-on-target.  
However, comparing the proportional confidence intervals indicates there are no 
statistical significance between and the baseline and Test Case 3.  The average number of 
targets destroyed decreases by only two over all ten runs.  The number of detections did 
not appear to influence the mission objective of targets killed before firing.  This doesn't 
downplay the importance of satellite assets in-theater, but for our model it does reveal an 
interesting aspect of time critical targeting. 
MOP 3 
 MOP 3 was defined as "The proportion of targets destroyed by the end of the 24-
hour period of operations." 
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Analysis 
 Reference Table 3 for the populations we compared.  Table 6 identifies the 
average proportions as well as the lower and upper bounds for the 95% proportional 
confidence intervals we developed for MOP 3.  The proportional technique was used for 
this MOP because, like MOP 2, there was an absence of normality due to the attrition of 
the target set over time.  This attrition caused the probabilities of detection and kill to 
change over the course of the 24-hour operations.  Additionally, the number of targets 
destroyed would never exceed the number of targets in the scenario forcing us to view the 
proportion of targets destroyed. 
Table 6. MOP 3 Confidence Intervals 





Baseline 0.5357 1.1109 0.8233 N/A 
Test Case 2 0.7376 1.1224 0.9300 No 
Test Case 3 0.2116 0.9551 0.5833 No 
 
Figure 22 shows the number of targets destroyed in both the Baseline and Test Case 2.  
Even though the average number of targets destroyed before the end of operations 
increased when the UAVs were removed, the difference in proportions is not statistically 
significant. 
Figure 23 depicts the drop in number of targets destroyed, from the Baseline to 
Test Case 3, when the satellites were removed from the scenario.  Again, drawing from 
Table 6, we are not able to make any definite conclusions about the effectiveness of the 
F-16s or the UAVs.  The fact that removing the satellites meant the UAVs were, 
generally speaking, the source of initial target detection still has no definitive meaning 
here even though the average proportion of targets destroyed dropped in Test Case 3.  
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Again, the proportionality of the populations, given the attrition and small number of 
replications, showed no statistically significant difference. 
 
Figure 22. Total Kills With No UAVs 
 
Figure 23. Total Kills With No Satellites 
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MOP 4 
 MOP 4 was defined as, "Which Blue Force agent detected which target and at 
what time did the detection occur?" 
Analysis 
 MOP 4 is a measure we looked at for a single run without any statistical 
comparisons between test cases.  It was selected for inclusion because of its operational 
nature – TCTs.  The data was collected over 10 runs and filtered to display the Blue 
Force sensor detections, by agent, over one run (24 hours).  The variables graphed were 
"Time" and "Run" on the x-axis, while "Sensor" and "Target" were on the y-axis.  We 
then filtered the data again to display only one target, SCUD_TEL#10, over one run.  
Following Figure 24, we step through the series of events in the graph. 
 
Figure 24. Who saw what and when 
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At 459 minutes from the start of the scenario, Sat1 detected SCUD_TEL#10 and 
continued the detection through its orbit until 463 minutes.  At that time the target 
detection was transmitted to B_AOC where it updated the LTL.  The LTL was then 
transmitted from the B_AOC to GlobalHawk2 which was flying on UAV_TAO_2.  
GlobalHawk2 then departed its TAO and proceeded to the target location.  While it was 
in-route to the location, Sat2 passed over the region and detected the target from 550 – 
554 minutes.  That information was relayed to the AOC and passed on to the UAV.  With 
the LTL now updated, GlobalHawk2 altered its course towards the new location of that 
target.  We know the target has moved since the first detection because of the Red Force 
CONOPS, and was now somewhere in its setup, fire and tear down delay and preparing 
to move for defilade again.  GlobalHawk2 arrived at the location and initially detected 
SCUD_TEL#10 at 592 minutes from start.  Shortly thereafter, Sat5_9 crossed over the 
region and detected the target from 594 – 598 minutes.  The target began moving some 
time after GlobalHawk2 got its initial fix at 592 minutes because the UAV tracked the 
target until 656 minutes – that's just over one hour.  After the initial UAV detection, 
GlobalHawk2 transmitted the target location to B_AOC which updated the LTL and re-
transmitted to the F-16s flying CAP in that region.  The F-16s broke off their CAP and 
flew towards the target location on the LTL; however, by the time they arrived 
SCUD_TEL#10 had already gone into defilade and GlobalHawk2 had left the area – an 
opportunity lost for the Blue Forces.  The next time SCUD_TEL#10 appeared on the 
radar was at 1090 minutes when Sat8_9 detected it.  Once again, the LTL was updated 
with the target location and transmitted to the AOC and then on to the appropriate UAV – 
it is possible that the target crossed from one region to another before being detected by 
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Sat8_9.  Thus, it may not have been GlobalHawk2's responsibility.  Regardless of where 
the target was located, the notified UAV never made it to the target location.  What 
appears to have happened this time, is that F-16#7 and F-16#9 were flying off CAP 
(possibly engaging another target or returning to their CAP) and detected SCUD_TEL#10 
with their SAR sensors.  F-16#7 was the lead plane and detected SCUD_TEL#10 at 1160 
minutes; F-16#9 was the wingman and detected the target at 1161 minutes.  Bombs were 
on target at 1162 minutes. 
By comparison, Figure 25 was graphed to show the difference in the same event 
when the UAVs were removed.  This is possible because we used the same random 
number seed, the same starting target locations and the same replication number.  Notice 
that the differences in times are due to the hiding and movement "choices" our 
SCUD_TEL agents can make.   
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Figure 25 Who saw what and when, with no UAVs 
Overall Implications of Results 
 The analysis of each MOP revealed interesting information about the Blue Force 
effectiveness.  Namely, the satellites are key contributors to early detection of TCTs.  
However, the early detections did not always lead to faster response times by the F-16s; 
especially when the UAVs were in the kill chain.  Although it didn't always happen that 
the satellites were the agents scoring the initial detection, we noticed that when they were 
removed from the scenario completely the overall average number of detections dropped. 
Additionally, the UAVs seemed to contribute counter-intuitively in our model.  That is, 
we expected the UAVs to improve the kill chain prosecution by being able to cover larger 
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areas of the AOO, but our results showed otherwise.  The slow F-16 response in getting 
to the targets can largely be explained by the CONOPS in place. 
The next chapter concludes our research efforts with some additional insight to 
the results of our MOPs.  Moreover, suggested changes to our model will be made and 




 Our research used SEAS, an agent-based simulation tool, to investigate the SCUD 
hunt problem that United States and Coalition forces encountered during Operation 
Desert Storm.  Initially we considered using an existing SEAS model; however, we 
ultimately decided that constructing our own would provide the benefit of containing 
exactly what we wanted in it.  That is to say, other models, though they were perfect for 
their intended use, may have contained too much agent behavior that was not desired for 
our purposes.  Thus, we were able to build a relatively small and simple model that 
adequately represented the system we were trying to simulate.  Our research was 
sponsored by Air Combat Command (ACC) and provided insight to measures of 
performance (MOP) they were interested in.  This chapter concludes our research by 
summarizing the MOPs we collected data for; presenting issues with assumptions and 
model development; and finally, recommendations for future avenues of research using 
SEAS or agent-based models in general. 
Summary of Measures of Performance 
 Four unique MOPs were developed for our research.  They are listed here: 
1. The number of initial target detections, by any sensor, within two hours of 
the first target appearance. 
2. The proportion of targets destroyed before being able to fire. 
3. The proportion of targets destroyed by the end of the 24-hour period of 
operations. 




These MOPs are the result of partnering with ACC and understanding the 
capabilities of an agent-based model such as SEAS.  Much of the data could be obtained 
by using the SEAS post-processor; however, some information had to be manually 
extracted after post-processing.  Table 7 is a summary table of the numerical results from 
MOPs 1, 2 and 3. 
Table 7. Summary of MOP Results 
MOP 1 Paired-t 95% Confidence Intervals with Statistical Significance 
Baseline Versus 
 
C.I. Lower Bound C.I. Upper Bound 
Statistically 
Significant?
No F-16s 1.00 -2.03 4.03 No 
No UAVs -0.20 -2.68 2.28 No 
No Satellites 9.80 7.70 11.90 Yes 
MOP 2 95% Proportional Confidence Intervals with Statistical Significance 





Baseline 0.0113 0.7420 0.3767 N/A 
Test Case 2 0.1502 0.9032 0.5267 No 
Test Case 3 0.0 0.6500 0.3033 No 
MOP 3 95% Proportional Confidence Intervals with Statistical Significance 





Baseline 0.5357 1.1109 0.8233 N/A 
Test Case 2 0.7376 1.1224 0.9300 No 
Test Case 3 0.2116 0.9551 0.5833 No 
 
Before reviewing the results from the above table, we must address the fact that 
our sample populations were small, n = 10.  This sample size was chosen primarily 
because larger sample sizes resulted in data manipulation issues within Excel.  In 
addition, a quick analysis of the Baseline data revealed our output was approximately 
normal with only 10 replications.  By using the same starting random number seed for 
each test case and because of correlation introduced in generating the target starting 
)(nZ
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locations, our analysis plan for MOP1 included a paired-t test.  Specifically, we 
programmed our model to read in the same set of target starting locations for all 
replications across all test cases.  MOP 2 and MOP 3 required the use of a proportional 
test for their confidence intervals.  This was due to a violation of the normality 
assumption due to attrition of target set. 
The results of our MOPs fall into three categories: 1) Effectiveness of the F-16s; 
2) Effectiveness of the UAVs; and 3) Effectiveness of the satellites.  The three test cases 
we used were the result of our design of experiments where we removed one type of 
sensor platform at a time.  In other words, we had a Baseline case where all three agent-
types contributed to the data, Test Case 1 excluded only the F-16 agents, Test Case 2 
excluded only the UAV agents, and Test Case 3 excluded only the satellite agents.  Test 
Case 1 maps to the first category just mentioned, Test Case 2 maps to the second 
category, and Test Case 3 to the third. 
Let us start by summarizing the confidence intervals.  When a confidence interval 
spans zero, we are left only to say that we cannot make any definitive statement about the 
difference between the two populations.  Such is the case for MOP 1 when we compared 
our results for the Baseline against the same results from Test Case 1 and then against 
Test Case 2.  Comparing against Test Case 3, however, resulted in a statistically 
significant difference in the populations.  We concluded that removing the satellites left a 
large gap in early detections.  The lingering results of that were less overall detections by 
the UAVs and, consequently, the F-16s.   
For MOP 2, when we compared the Baseline against Test Case 2 the confidence 
intervals overlapped indicating no statistically significant difference between the two 
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populations.  However, we noted that the average proportion of targets destroyed before 
being able to fire increased.  We speculated that was because the UAVs were absent.  The 
F-16 behavior became more evident, though, while observing the simulation play out 
showing they could cover a larger target set without having to wait for the UAV handoff 
of one target.  The Baseline compared to Test Case 3 brought a decreased average (not 
statistically significant) because of the loss of early detection from the satellites. 
Finally, MOP 3 again no statistically significant differences were detected 
between the populations.  In Test Case 3, the presence of the UAVs and the consequent 
slow through-put of targets to the F-16s nullified any early satellite detections as seen in 
the other test cases; however, if anyone asks, "Why space?" – this research gives some 
insight.  
MOP 4 is a stand-alone measure looking at a specific simulated engagement for 
time critical targeting.  In this MOP, we generated results to address the question "Who 
saw what when?"  The results of this question can have far-reaching impact.  We derived 
no quantitative metrics for this MOP, but we graphically displayed the results of all 
sensor detections against one target over the course of one run.  The conclusion we 
arrived at is "it depends."  It depends on what the CONOPS were that we programmed 
for our agents.  It depends on how robust our model was and how we implemented 
operational tactics.  It depends on the assumptions we made about sensor parameters.  
There were many components of our model that we found could have made a difference 
in the TCT aspect of our research, but in the end, we concluded that our model does give 
a starting point for valuable insight. 
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Assumptions and Model Development 
 As just mentioned, the assumptions we made while developing our model had an 
impact on the results we obtained and presented for our research.  This section details 
some of those assumptions and the resulting impact on the model. 
 First, to keep our model simple we gave all agents unlimited fuel.  This seems 
plain enough, but it implies that our UAVs and F-16s never had to worry about leaving 
their position (even if they were replenished by another similar mission asset).  It also 
meant we didn't have to concern ourselves with modeling tanker assets or turn-around 
time for maintenance.  Additionally, crews were eliminated altogether by this 
assumption. 
 Second, we assumed instantaneous communication transfer with no degradation 
to the signal or corruption of the data.  This means that all sensor-to-shooter links 
happened with no latency in the signal.  For instance, the real-world Global Hawk 
platform can be flown from in-theater or from halfway around the world.  In either case, 
the bandwidth required to send all of its imaging data and communication data is 
enormous and can take minutes to accomplish due to the numerous nodes the signal may 
have to pass through before reaching the command and control element.  Even then, there 
can be considerable delay in the processing of the imagery and making the requisite 
decisions.  Our model assumes no effect on the performance of the agents due to these 
nodal delays and latencies.  Thus, it ultimately provides a "best-case" scenario for all 
communication and data links.  Additionally, we chose not to model weather and terrain 
for the same reasons. 
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 Our third assumption was to set all probabilities of detection and probabilities of 
kill to one (1).  Considering our military's experience with the SCUD hunt mission and 
the effectiveness of our modern inventory, we chose to eliminate the target set on a one-
strike basis. 
 One last assumption to mention is that we assumed all sensor capabilities were 
present in our "cookie-cutter" design.  Ultimately, we desired flexibility in our model's 
ability to represent numerous sensor types.  Thus, we used the SEAS sensor template and 
applied appropriate settings and input parameters that could be tailored in the future to 
meet more specific sensor objectives.  The inclusion of weather and terrain TAOs would 
greatly increase the complexity of this model and the resulting affects on sensor 
capabilities. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 The SCUD hunt problem is not new to the United States military, but it reveals a 
larger problem that we have yet to master.  That is, searching for elusive, hiding targets.  
Thus, our first recommendation is to modify the F-16 CONOPS allowing them to sweep 
for a target should they arrive at a target location after the target moved.  Additionally, 
changing MOP 1 to reflect the time of the first target appearance would ultimately reduce 
the kill chain timeline.  Another opportunity for model growth would be the addition of 
weather and terrain TAOs.  Weather TAOs would affect the sensors' Pd whereas terrain 
TAOs affect the sensors' range.  Finally, instituting decoy targets would round out our 
model's design.  ACC currently uses decoys as well as real targets in their Extended Air 
Defense Simulation (EADSIM) model.  The value of decoys is that they can distract the 
Blue Forces from attaining their goal of finding the real SCUD_TEL targets.  Moreover, 
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decoys would force the use of Pid and the IFF probability.  For SEAS, the Pid is the 
probability of identifying any target against which the sensing agent has a probability of 
detection.  The IFF probability is the probability of misidentifying a friendly agent as an 
enemy target. 
We believe that agent-based modeling is a powerful and robust concept that can greatly 
aid in the modeling and simulation of the SCUD hunt problem.  Having a model where 
agents can interact with each other, with the environment and contain the ability to make 
decisions is applying a "near-reality" capability to a very real problem.  Our model has 
demonstrated itself to be a useful tool – flexible for analysis and capable of analyzing 
trade-offs between the various mixes of sensors used for the SCUD hunt problem.  The 
model adds value to the understanding of this type of problem and is a dynamic model 
useful for analyzing additional tradeoffs.
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Appendix A.    List of Acronyms 
ABM  Agent-based Model (Modeling) 
ACC  Air Combat Command 
AOC  Air Operations Center 
AOO  Area of Operations 
C3I  Command, Control, Computers and Information 
CAP  Combat Air Patrol 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
EO/IR  Electro-Optical/Infrared 
F2T2  Find-Fix-Track-Target 
GMTI  Ground Moving Target Indicator 
HPC  High Performance Computer 
JSOW  Joint Standoff Weapon 
LTL  Local Target List 
MANA Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata 
MOP  Measure of Performance 
OIF  Operation Iraqi Freedom 
OODA  Observe-Orient-Decide-Act 
Pd  Probability of Detection 
Pid  Probability of Identification 
Pk  Probability of Kill 
SAR  Synthetic Aperture Radar 
SEAS  System Effectiveness and Analysis Simulation 
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TAO  Tactical Area of Operations 
TEL  Transporter/Erector/Launcher 
TPL  Tactical Programming Language 
UAV  Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
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Appendix B    MOP Data 
MOP 1 Baseline and all Test Cases 
Run Baseline No F-16s No UAVs No Satellites
1 14 15 17 5 
2 12 18 18 7 
3 16 8 14 4 
4 16 13 14 9 
5 19 15 17 3 
6 14 12 11 4 
7 17 15 17 7 
8 15 16 12 4 
9 15 20 14 5 
10 14 10 20 6 
 
MOP 2 Baseline and Test Cases two and three 
Run Baseline No UAVs No Satellites
1 9 11 7 
2 9 16 10 
3 12 16 13 
4 15 20 10 
5 13 16 8 
6 12 16 7 
7 13 18 6 
8 10 15 13 
9 7 18 9 
10 13 12 8 
 
MOP 3 Baseline and Test Cases two and three 
Run Baseline No UAVs No Satellites
1 24 26 21 
2 22 30 17 
3 28 29 17 
4 25 29 17 
5 24 27 18 
6 25 27 16 
7 26 29 14 
8 26 29 19 
9 23 27 18 






Altenburg K., J. Schlecht, and K. Nygard. “An Agent-based Simulation for Modeling 
Intelligent Munitions.”  In Proceedings of the Second WSEAS International 
Conference on Simulation, Modeling and Optimization, Skiathos, Greece (Sep).  
Available at http://www.cs.ndsu.nodak.edu/nygard/research/munitions.  2002 
 
Banks, Jerry, et al (2005). Discrete-Event System Simulation (pp. 354-355). New Jersey: 
Pearson Prentice Hall. 
 
Berg, David, "Personal Correspondence." Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, VA, 
October 2005 – March 2006. 
 
Brown, Terry, and Martin, Eric. "Assessing the Mission Effectiveness of Morphing 
Aircraft Structures Technologies in Hunter/Killer Operations." Briefing to the 73 
Military Operations Research Society Symposium, 2005. 
 
Bullock R., McIntyre G., and Hill R.  "Using Agent-Based Modeling To Capture 
Airpower Strategic Effects."  Proceedings of 2000 Winter Simulation Conference. 
2000. 
 
Carl, R.G.  Search Theory and U-Boats in the Bay of Biscay. School of Engineering and 
Management, Air Force Institute of Technology (AU), Wright-Patterson AFB 
OH: MS thesis, AFIT/GOR/ENS/03-05, March 2003. 
 
Cormen, Thomas H. et al.  Introduction to Algorithms (2nd Edition).  Boston:  McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 2003. 
DeStefano, G.V.  Agent Based Simulation: SEAS Evaluation of DoDAF Architecture. 
School of Engineering and Management, Air Force Institute of Technology (AU), 
Wright-Patterson AFB OH: MS thesis, AFIT/GOR/ENS/04-05, March 2004. 
Ferber, J.  Multi-Agent Systems: An Introduction to Distributed Artificial Intelligence.  
Harlow, England:  Addison-Wesley, 1999. 
 
Hassler, Robert T.  An Excel-based Surveillance Planning and Scoring Tool for the 
SCUD Hunting Mission.  School of Engineering and Management, Air Force 
Institute of Technology (AU), Wright-Patterson AFB OH: MS Graduate Research 
Project, AFIT/GOS/ENS/05-08, June 2005. 
 
Illachinski, Andy. "Irreducible Semi-Autonomous Adaptive Combat (ISAAC): An 
Artificial-Life Approach to Land Combat," Military Operations Research, Vol. 5, 
No. 3: 29-46 (2000). 
 
87 
Jane's International Defence Review. "Sky-high Surveillance Realigns the Battlefield."  
Edition 1997, v. 030, issue 009, p 65. 
 
Jane's International Defence Review. "The All-seeing Eye Above." December 01, 2002. 
 
Jensen, Paul A. and Bard, Jonathan F.  Operations Research:  Models and Methods.  New 
York:  John Wiley & Sons, 2003. 
 
Law, Averill M. and W. David Kelton.  Simulation Modeling and Analysis, 3rd Ed.  
Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2000. 
 
Miller, J.O.  OPER 672: Combat  Modeling II.  Classroom Lecture Slides. 2005 
 
Price, Joseph C.  Game Theory and U-Boats in the Bay of Biscay. School of Engineering 
and Management, Air Force Institute of Technology (AU), Wright-Patterson AFB 
OH: MS thesis, AFIT/GOR/ENS/03-18, March 2003. 
 
Reynolds, Craig W. "Flocks, Herds, and Schools: A Distributed Behavioral Model."  
Computer Graphics, Vol. 21, No. 4: 25 – 34, July 1987. 
Ripley, Tim.  “Scud Hunting:  Counter-force Operations against Theatre Ballistic 
Missiles,” Bailrigg Memorandum 18.  Centre for Defence and International 
Security Studies (CDISS), Lancaster University, 1996. 
Rocha, L.M.  From Artificial Life to Semiotic Agent Models: Review and Research 
Directions. Los Alamos National Laboratory report, LA-UR-99-5475. Los 
Alamos NM, 1999. 
Russell S. and Norvig P.  Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach. New York: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1995. 
 
SPARTA, Inc.: Home Page. Retrieved Nov. 12, 2005, from SEAS Web site: 
http://www.teamseas.com/ (2005). 
 
SPARTA, Inc.: Introduction. Retrieved Nov. 12, 2005, from SEAS Web site help files: 
http://www.teamseas.com/resources/downloads.html (2005). 
 
SPARTA, Inc.: Sensor. Retrieved Nov. 12, 2005, from SEAS Web site help files: 
http://www.teamseas.com/resources/downloads.html (2005). 
 
Stockton, R. G.  Models Versus Analysis. Discussion Paper distributed within the Center 
for Army Analysis, May 1987. 
 
Taylor, James G. Hierarchy-of-Models Approach for Aggregated-Force Attrition. 
Proceedings of the 2000 Winter Simulation Conference. 2000: 925 – 932. 
 
88 
Widdowson, Brian.  "Project Albert: Developing Capabilities, Transitioning to 
Applications."  Briefing for USMC M&S Review, 4 Nov 03. 
 
Withrow, Melissa and Sanders, Brian, PhD.  "Morphing Wing Technology."  AFRL 
Horizons.  Retrieved Nov. 15, 2005, from AFRL Horizons Web site, reference 
document http://www.afrlhorizons.com/Briefs/Jun05/VAH0502.html (2005). 
 
Young, M.J.  "Agent-Based Modeling and Behavioral Representation."  Air Force 




Captain Jeffrey E. Rucker graduated from Sumner Academy of the Arts and 
Sciences in Kansas City, Kansas.  He began his undergraduate studies pursuing the 
biological sciences.  After marrying, he turned his academic attention towards his 
passion: mathematics.  He graduated with his bachelor's degree in mathematics from 
California State University in Northridge, California.  Shortly thereafter, he completed 
his Air Force commissioning via Officer Training School in 2001. 
His first assignment was to Detachment 4, Air Force Operational Test and 
Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) in Colorado Springs, Colorado.  At that assignment, he 
was introduced to the world of space-based navigation as the lead analyst for the Global 
Positioning System (GPS).  He was responsible for analysis as the GPS system was 
undergoing modernization.  He also took on analyst responsibilities with the MILSTAR 
test team. 
He departed AFOTEC in August 2004 and entered the Graduate School of 
Engineering and Management, Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), to pursue his 
Master's Degree in Operations Research.  Upon graduation from AFIT, he will report to 
Headquarters, Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, Virginia, to join their analysis 
division.
 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 
Form Approved 
OMB No. 074-0188 
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and 
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of the collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, 
Suite 1204, Arlington, VA  22202-4302.  Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to an penalty for failing to comply with a collection of 
information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.   
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 
24-02-2006 
2. REPORT TYPE  
Master’s Thesis 
     
3. DATES COVERED (From – To) 
Jun 2005 – Mar 2006 
5a.  CONTRACT NUMBER 
5b.  GRANT NUMBER 
 
4.  TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
 
USING AGENT-BASED MODELING TO SEARCH FOR 
ELUSIVE HIDING TARGETS 
  
 
5c.  PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 
5d.  PROJECT NUMBER 
 
5e.  TASK NUMBER 
6.  AUTHOR(S) 
 
Rucker, Jeffrey, E., Captain, USAF 
 
 
 5f.  WORK UNIT NUMBER 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S) 
  Air Force Institute of Technology 
 Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/EN) 
 2950 Hobson Way, Building 642 
 WPAFB OH 45433-7765 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
    REPORT NUMBER 
 
     AFIT/GOR/ENS/06-16 
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 
 
 
9.  SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
SAF/XCOM 
ATTN:  Lt Col Robert Boyles 
1570 Air Force Pentagon                 DSN 425-5057 
Washington, DC 20330-1570          e-mail:robert.boyles@pentagon.af.mil  
11.  SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT 
NUMBER(S) 
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
       
        APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED. 
 




14. ABSTRACT  
The SCUD hunt problem that emerged during Operation Desert Storm has become a source of great interest to major commands like 
Air Combat Command.  One of the metrics used to measure the effectiveness of our operations in a SCUD hunt is time to detect and 
target.  We use the agent-based System Effectiveness and Analysis Simulation (SEAS) to provide a simulation environment in which 
all the elements of a SCUD hunt mission can adequately be modeled.  Our Blue Force agents are modeled as multirole fighters, 
satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) with various sensor capabilities.  The Red Force agents are modeled as the SCUD 
transporter/erector/launcher (TEL).  Particular interest is paid to the effectiveness of various sensors modeled in a set of scenarios 
following an experimental design.  Four measures of performance (MOP) were fashioned to provide insight into the contribution of 
sensors at work in a SCUD hunt.  These MOPs were evaluated to show any statistically significant differences between various mixes 
of sensors. 
15. SUBJECT TERMS 
Agent-based modeling, SEAS, System Effectiveness and Analysis Simulation, SCUD hunt, elusive hiding 
target, sensor, design of experiments, measure of performance, MOP 
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 19a.  NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON 







c. THIS PAGE 
 
U 
17. LIMITATION OF  




18. NUMBER  
      OF 
      PAGES 
 
100 
19b.  TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) 
(937) 255-3636, ext 4326; e-mail:  john.miller@afit.edu 
   Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18 
 
